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ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL ARTICLE




HE FIRST ILLINOIS Constitution was adopted in 1818, effective
January 1, 1819, and remained in force for twenty-nine years.'
The second Illinois Constitution was adopted in 1847, effective
April 1, 1848, and remained in force for twenty-two years. 2 The third
Illinois Constitution was adopted in 1870, effective August 8, 1870,
and has been in force ever since.3 Thus, the court structure provided
MR. FINS received the degrees of Pb.B. and J.D. from De Paul University. He is a
member of the Bars of Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United States. He is the
author of ten books and treatises on Illinois and Federal Practice and Procedure: ILLI-
NOIS MOTION AND PETITION PRACTICE, ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ILLINOIS AD-
MINISTRATIVE REVIEW ACT, ANNOTATED, ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE, ILLINOIS PROCEDURE,
APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR IN ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS REVISION OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
AND SUPREME COURT RULES, FEDERAL PRACTICE GUIDE, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE, AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. He "was a lecturer in the Post Graduate Division
of the John Marshall Law School from 1939 to 1949 and at Lawyers Post-Graduate
Clinics from 1949 to 1954. Numerous articles written by Mr. Fins have been published
in the ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAcO LAW REVIEW, the JOHN
MARSHALL LAW QUARTERLY, the ILLINOIS STATE BAR JOURNAL and the CHICAGO BAR
RECORD. He was one of the draftsmen of the Illinois Administrative Review Act. During
1954 to 1956 he served as a member of the Executive Conmittee of the Illinois State
Bar Association Section on Civil Practice and Procedure, and be has been serving as a
member of the Civil Practice Committee of the Chicago Bar Association continuously
from 1950 to and including the present time. Mr. Fins is now a member of the Joint
Committee on Implementation of the Judicial Amendment appointed by the Illinois
State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association.
' The first Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Convention called in pur-
suance of the Enabling Act of Congress of April 18, 1818, c. 67 (3 Star. 428). It was
adopted by the Convention of August 26, 1818, and became effective January 1, 1819,
by virtue of the Congressional Resolution of December 3, 1818, admitting Illinois to
the Union.
2 The Constitution of 1848 was adopted by convention August 31, 1847. It was rati-
fied by popular vote March 6, 1848, and declared in force April 1, 1848.
Pursuant to an act of the General Assembly calling a convention to amend the Con-
stitution (Ill. Laws 1861, p. 84), a constitutional convention was assembled January 7,
1862, and adopted a proposed constitution on March 22, 1862. It was submitted to a
popular vote and rejected June 17, 1862.
3 This is the constitution which is now in force and which was adopted in Conven-
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by that Constitution has been in effect over ninety years, except that,
in 1904, Section 34 was added to Article IV of the Constitution, mak-
ing possible the creation of the Municipal Court of Chicago and the
abolition of justices of the peace and police magistrates in the City of
Chicago.4
By 1950, it was generally agreed that Illinois was in need of a new
Judicial Article, but there was considerable diversity of opinion as to
the provisions to be included in such Article. In 1951, a Judicial Arti-
cle Revision Commission was appointed with directions that:
The Commission shall make a thorough study of the need for revising
Article VI of the Constitution of Illinois and of the various alternatives for its
revision that have been or may be suggested and shall prepare a proposed draft
of an amendment or amendments to said Article for presentation to the Sixty-
eighth General Assembly.5
On April 14, 1953, the Judicial Article Revision Commission re-
ported:
The most serious consideration has been given, and must continue to be
given, to the proposals of the Joint Committee of the Bar Associations; the
vital subject of revision of the Article was given a laborious, intensive and pro-
tracted study by the Joint Bar Committee consisting of sincere and capable
lawyers with many years of experience in the practice of law in Illinois. The
original draft of a proposed Judicial Article submitted by that Joint Bar Com-
mittee, represented a compromise of the various ideas of its members and of
the Bar Associations by which they were chosen. Following the various con-
ferences of this Commission with the Joint Committee of the Bar Associations,
the Bar Association proposal was revised several times.
Certain differences continue to exist, however, between this Commission and
the Joint Committee of the Bar Associations, as to the latest revision of the pro-
posed Judicial Article. A Sub-Committee appointed by the Commission and
the Joint Bar Committee was unable to compose all of these differences.6
In 1953, a proposed Judicial Article drafted by a Committee of the
Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association was
tion May 13, 1870. It was ratified by the people at an election July 2, 1870, and de-
clared in force August 8, 1870.
A proposed constitution was adopted in Convention September 12, 1922. It was sub-
mitted to the people at an election December 12, 1922, and was rejected. See Dodd,
Illinois Rejects a New Constitution, 7 MINN. L. REV. 177 (1923); Davis, Defects and
Causes of Defeat of the Proposed Constitution of 1922, 26 CHICAGO B. REcoRD 276
(1945).
4 See Weiss Memorial Hosp. v. Kroucke, 12 Ill.2d 98, 145 N.E.2d 71 (1957); United
Biscuit Co. v. Voss Truck Lines, 407 Ill. 488, 95 N.E.2d 439 (1950).
5 Ill. Laws 1951, at 362.
6Report of Commission, pp. 3-4.
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presented to the Illinois Legislature.7 This draft was not acceptable to
the Legislature.8 In 1955, the Bar Associations' draft was again intro-
duced and again met with lack of success in the Legislature.' In 1957,
the Bar Associations' draft was again introduced, and, after many com-
promises, was, on June 27, 1957, adopted by the General Assembly. 0
A sharp conflict arose in political as well as legal circles as to the de-
sirability of the compromised Judicial Article of 1957. Heated de-
bates on the subject took place in many parts of Illinois, and the news-
papers gave the matter a great deal of attention. At the general elec-
tion held on November 4, 1958, the Judicial Article of 1957 failed to
receive the number of votes required by the Constitution for its adop-
tion." On December 8, 1958, the State Electoral Board, consisting of
the Attorney General, the Auditor of Public Accounts, the State
Treasurer, the Secretary of State and the Governor, announced the
result of the election and declared that the Judicial Article of 1957 was
not adopted.'2 On the same day, December 8, 1958, the proponents of
the Article filed an election contest in the Circuit Court of Lake
County. On May 21, 1959, the Circuit Court dismissed the contest-
ants' petition and, on January 22, 1960, the Supreme Court of Illinois
7 See STEINER & GovE, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN ILLINOIS 164-98 (1960).
8 Id. at 183.
9 Id. at 186-7.
For a history of the movement for the adoption of a new Judicial Article in Illinois,
see Witwer, The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 53 (1947);
Cedarquist, The Continuing Need for Judicial Reform in Illinois, 4 DE PAUL L. REV.
153 (1955).
10 Senate Joint Resolution No. 47, Ill. Laws 1957, at 2909-15.
Section 2 of Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 provides in part:
"Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House of the General
Assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected
to each of the two houses, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and
nays of each house thereon, shall be entered in full on their respective journals, and said
amendments shall be submitted to the electors of this State for adoption or rejection, at
the next election of members of the General Assembly in such manner as may be
prescribed by law."
11 Section 2 of Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, as amended in 1949
and adopted in 1950, commonly known as the Gateway Amendment, provides that "if
either a majority of the electors voting at said election, or two-thirds of the electors
voting on any such proposed amendment shall vote for the proposed amendment, it
shall become a part of this Constitution."
12 The total number of electors in the State of Illinois who voted on November 4,
1958, was 3,427,278. The total number of electors in the State of Illinois who voted on
November 4, 1958, on the proposed Judicial Article Amendment of 1957 was 2,483,158,
of which number 1,589,655 voted for and 893,503 voted against the proposed Constitu-
tional Amendment. 1959-60 ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK 937.
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affirmed,' 3 thus leaving the Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870
in full force and effect.
1961 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 39
In 1961, a proposed new Judicial Article drafted by a Committee of
the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association was
presented to the Illinois Legislature, and there was also presented to
the Legislature (with only a change in effective date) a draft of the
proposed Judicial Article of 1957 which had failed in the referendum
of 1958.1" Neither draft was acceptable to the Illinois General Assem-
bly. However, from these two proposals emerged a compromised
Judicial Article which did not represent the choice of any individual
or any group, but was acceptable to many former "opponents" on a
"give and take" basis with the hope of improvement in the future.
This compromised document was, on June 29, 1961, adopted by the
House and, on June 30, 1961, concurred in by the Senate, as House
Joint Resolution 394 and will be submitted to the voters of Illinois on
November 6, 1962, and, if approved in this referendum,"' will become
effective on January 1, 1964."0
JUDICIAL ARTICLE OF 1961
The Judicial Article consists of 21 numbered sections and a Sched-
ule of 13 numbered paragraphs." The Schedule provides for the tran-
sition from the present to the new judicial system and for the imple-
mentation of the Judicial Article by the General Assembly and by the
Supreme Court of Illinois. 8
1. Court System Simplified
The present Illinois court system, under the Constitution of 1870, is
very complex. The Judicial Article of 1870 provides for "one supreme
18 Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill.2d 400, 164 N.E.2d 481 (1960).
13a Both Resolutions were introduced in the General Assembly on the same day,
March 28, 1961.
14 1l. Laws 1961, pp. 917-25.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 1.
17 The use of a "Schedule" to cover the transition from the old to the new law has
been employed by each of the three Illinois Constitutions of 1818, 1848 and 1870, re-
spectively.
18 The following analysis is presented on the assumption that the Illinois electorate
will, in 1962, vote favorably on the Judicial Article of 1961.
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court, circuit courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police
magistrates, and such courts as may be created by law in and for
cities and incorporated towns."'" The Constitution of 1870 provides
for "appellate courts, '"20 for a Superior Court of Cook County, for a
Criminal Court of Cook County2' which "shall have the jurisdiction
of a circuit court in all cases of criminal and quasi-criminal nature,
arising in the County of Cook, or that may be brought before said
court pursuant to law,"' 22 for a "probate court in each county having
a population of over 50,000, ''23 and, by virtue of a constitutional
amendment of 1904, for the creation of "municipal courts in the city
of Chicago. ' 2
4
In contrast with the above intricate court system, the Judicial
Article of 1961 provides that "[t]he judicial power is vested in a
Supreme Court, an Appellate Court, and Circuit Courts. '25
2. Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 divided the State
into seven judicial districts in each of which district one Supreme
Court judge is elected, making the Supreme Court of Illinois a tribunal
of seven judges.26 The official United States census of 1960 shows that
the total population of the State of Illinois is 10,081,158 and that the
population of Cook County is 5,129,725. Despite the fact that Cook
County is inhabited by more than half of the Illinois population, one
Supreme Court judge is elected from the five counties of Cook, Du-
Page, Kankakee, Lake and Will, all of which counties comprise one
judicial district for the election of one judge to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. The remainder of the State, which consists of less than half
of the Illinois population, elects the other six judges of the Supreme
19 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
20 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
21 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 23-4. Under sections 23 and 24 of article VI of the Illinois
Constitution, the Superior and Circuit Courts of Cook County are placed upon the
same footing, there being no distinction between them except in name, and, therefore,
where a special statutory jurisdiction is conferred on the Circuit Court, the Superior
Court will by the same Act, though not named, acquire a like jurisdiction, and vice
versa. People v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 112 N.E.2d 697 (1953); Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366
Ill. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937); People ex. rel. Donovan v. Sweitzer, 330 Ill. 426, 161
N.E. 730 (1928).
22 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 26.
2'3 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 20. 25 Judicial Article of 1961, § 1.
24 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 34. 26 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 5.
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Court. To cure this inequality of representation of the inhabitants of
Cook County on the Supreme Court, the Judicial Article of 1961 di-
vided the State into five judicial districts with Cook County as the
First Judicial District.27 Cook County will elect three of the seven
Supreme Court judges and the rest of the State will elect the other
four judges, each from a designated judicial district.28
As a result of this change, the counties of Lake, DuPage, Will and
Kankakee will also have greater representation on the Supreme
Court. The population of these four counties, according to the official
United States census of 1960, is as follows: Lake-293,656; DuPage-
313,459; Will-191,617; and Kankakee-92,063. Under the Judicial
Article of 1961, Lake and DuPage counties will belong to the Second
Judicial District which has a population of 1,363,306, and Will and
Kankakee counties will belong to the Third Judicial District which
has a population of 1,266,779. Thus, the ratio of representation of
each of these four counties on the Supreme Court will be greater than
at present.
Similarly, inequality of representation on the Supreme Court will
be removed between the present Third and Fourth Districts down-
state. The present Third District has more than twice the number of
inhabitants of the Fourth District, whereas under the Judicial Article
of 1961 and the United States census of 1960, the Third, Fourth and
Fifth Districts will be almost equal in population.
However, in order to allow the incumbent seven judges of the Su-
preme Court to continue in office, it is provided that Cook County's
representation in the Supreme Court shall be increased to three judges
gradually, as the offices of two downstate Supreme Court judges be-
come vacant by death, resignation, removal, retirement or failure to be
re-elected.29
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that four
of the seven judges of the Supreme Court shall constitute a quorumn°
27 Judicial Article of 1961, § 3.
2 Id. § 4 and Schedule, para. 3 (a).
The population, acording to the 1960 census, of the proposed Districts (other than
Cook County) are: Second-1,363,306; Third-1,266,779; Fourth-l,119,293; and Fifth-
1,202,055. See 50 Ill. B. J. 71 (1961). The geographical composition of these last men-
tioned four districts (other than Cook County) may be changed by law. Judicial
Article of 1961, § 3.
29 judicial Article of 196 1, Schedule, para. 13. 30 ILL. CONsr. art. V1, § 1.
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and the concurrence of four shall be necessary to a decision, and the
Judicial Article of 1961 provides likewise.3 1
3. Chief Justice of Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that the
judges of the Supreme Court shall choose one of their number as Chief
Justice, but it does not provide as to how long he shall hold that
office.32 The Supreme Court has by rule set a one-year term for the
office of Chief Justice by providing that "[t]he term of chief justice
shall begin on the second Monday of September in each year."' 3 The
Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[t]he judges of the Supreme
Court shall select one of their number to serve as Chief Justice for a
term of three years. '3 4
4. Appellate Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that the
'"appellate courts shall be held by such number of judges of the circuit
courts, and at such times and places and in such manner as may be
provided by law."'35 By statute36 there are now four Appellate Courts
in Illinois, and by statute3 7 the Supreme Court of Illinois assigns three
judges to each district of the Appellate Courts. By statute8 the Su-
preme Court, upon request of the Appellate Court, may increase the
number of judges of any Appellate Courts, and by virtue of this
statute the Appellate Court for the First District, sitting in Chicago
and handling cases from Cook County only, now has nine judges-
three branches of three judges each-and the Appellate Court for the
Second District, sitting in Ottawa, now has six judges-two branches
of three judges each.
The Judicial Article of 1961 has completely changed the composi-
tion of the Appellate Courts, as follows:3 9
31 Judicial Article of 1961, § 4.
32 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
33 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.56 (1961).
34 Judicial Article of 1961, § 4.
35 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
36 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 25 (1961).
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 29 (1961).
38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, S§45, 52 (1961).
39 Judicial Article of 1961, § 6.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
1. There will be one Appellate Court in the State with five
branches, each covering a judicial district.
2. The Appellate Court will consist of a total of twenty-four
judges, twelve of whom will be from Cook County, and three from
each of the four downstate judicial districts. However, these numbers
are subject to change bylaw.
3. The judges of the Appellate Court will be elected as judges of
this Court and not, as heretofore, as judges of the Circuit Courts.
4. There will be such number of divisions, of not less than three
judges each, as the Supreme Court will prescribe.
5. There will be at least one division in each appellate district and
each division will sit at times and places prescribed by rules of the
Supreme Court.
6. The majority of a division will constitute a quorum and the con-
currence of a majority of the division will be necessary to a decision
of the Appellate Court.
To bring the statutes in harmony with the Judicial Article of 1961,
it will be necessary to revise and to repeal many sections of the three
Acts dealing with the Illinois Appellate Courts,40 and to enact laws for
the election of judges of the Appellate Court and the payment of their
salaries.
5. Circuit Court Integrated
Under the Judicial Article of 1961, the Circuit Courts will be the
only trial courts in the State of Illinois. The Article provides that on
January 1, 1964:
All justice of the peace courts, police magistrate courts, city, village and in-
corporated town courts, municipal courts, county courts, probate courts, the
Superior Court of Cook County, the Criminal Court of Cook County and the
Municipal Court of Chicago are abolished and all their jurisdiction, judicial
functions, powers and duties are transferred to the respective circuit courts,
and until otherwise provided by law non-judicial functions vested by law in
county courts or the judges thereof are transferred to the circuit courts.41
The State will be divided into judicial circuits each consisting of one
or more counties.42 Cook County will constitute a judicial circuit. 43
There will be one circuit court for each judicial circuit.4 4 At present
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 25-61a (1961).
41 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 5 (a). 43 Ibid.
42 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8. 44 Ibid.
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there are, by statute,4" twenty circuits outside of Cook County, and,
until changed by law, the existing judicial circuits will be continued."
To bring the Illinois statutes in harmony with the Judicial Article
of 1961, it will be necessary to repeal the following Acts:
"An Act to revise the law in relation to the Criminal Court of Cook County,"
approved February 12, 1872, as amended. 47
"An Act to extend the jurisdiction of county courts, and to provide for the
practice thereof, to fix the time for holding the same, and to repeal an act
therein named," approved March 26, 1874, as amended. 48
"An Act to authorize county judges to interchange, hold court for each
other and perform each other's duties," approved May 31, 1879.4 9
"An Act to authorize the several county and probate judges in this State to
interchange with and hold court for each other and with or for judges of cir-
cuit, superior, city, town and village and municipal courts and perform each
other's duties and the duties of judges of circuit, superior, city, town and village
and municipal courts in their own or any other county," approved May 13,
1903, as amended.50
"An Act in relation to probate courts, defining the jurisdiction thereof, reg-
ulating the practice therein, and fixing the time for holding the same," approved
April 27, 1877, as amended.51
"An Act to authorize the judge of the Probate Court in any county of more
than 70,000 and less than 500,000 inhabitants to appoint a shorthand reporter
for the taking and preservation of evidence, and fixing the compensation to be
paid therefor," approved June 28, 1919, as amended. 5
2
"An Act to authorize county and probate judges to perform the duties of
the office of one another in certain cases," approved April 10, 1885, as amended.5 3
"An Act in relation to county and probate judges," approved May 5, 1917.1 4
"An Act to prohibit county and probate clerks and deputy county or probate
clerks from preparing certain documents and from holding certain positions,"
approved June 8, 1909.55
"An Act to authorize the judges of county courts to appoint shorthand
reporters for the taking and preservation of evidence and to provide for their
compensation, in counties having a population of not more than 500,000," ap-
proved May 14, 1903, as amended.
56
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 5 72.1 (1961).
40 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 3 (b).
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § §164-70 (1961).
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,S § 171-296 (1961).
49 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 5297 (1961).
50 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 298 (1961).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 5§ 299-321 (1961).
52 1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 322-4 (1961).
53 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 325 (1961).
54 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 55326-7 (1961)
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,55 328-9 (1961).
56 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § §330-2 (1961).
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"An Act in relation to courts of record in cities, villages and incorporated
towns," approved May 10, 1909, as amended.5 7
"An Act in relation to the compensation and expenses of certain judges here-
after elected," approved July 22, 1959.58
"An Act in relation to a municipal court in the City of Chicago," approved
May 18, 1905, as amended.5 9
"An Act in relation to Municipal Courts in cities and villages," approved
June 26, 1929, as amended.60
"An Act concerning the transfer of civil actions between courts of record
of the same county," approved June 13, 1931, as amended. 60 a
"An Act providing for the use without charge of certain courtrooms by
police magistrates," approved July 11, 1957.01
"An Act to revise the law in relation to justices of the peace and constables,"
approved June 26, 1895, as amended. 62
In the Election Code, 3 many parts (particularly in Articles 2, 9 and
23) will have to be repealed and substitutions made because of the
abolition of the Superior Court of Cook County, the Criminal Court
of Cook County, the city, village, town and municipal courts, the
county and probate courts, the Municipal Court of Chicago, justices
of the peace and police magistrates, and because of the major changes
in the methods of election and re-election of judges.
A careful examination will have to be made of the whole Illinois
statute book to delete from various statutes references to the Superior
Court of Cook County, the Criminal Court of Cook County, county
courts, probate courts, city, village, town or municipal courts, the
Municipal Court of Chicago, justices of the peace and police magis-
trates.
6. Judicial Officers of Circuit Court
The Circuit Court will consist of three grades of judicial officers:
(a) circuit judges, (b) associate judges, and (c) magistrates.!"
(a) A circuit judge is elected and has all the authority possessed
by the Circuit Court.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 333-5a (1961).
68 IL,. Rirv. STAT. ch. 37, 355b (1961).
59 ILL. RFv. STAT. ch, 37, 1356-426 (1961).
60 ILL. REv. S'rAT. ch. 37, 11 442-504 (1961).
Goa ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 146, § 37 (1961).
61 ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 37, § 504.1 (1961).
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 79, §§ 1-191 (1961).
6.1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46 (1961).
04 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8.
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(b) An associate judge is elected and has all the authority possessed
by the Circuit Court, except that (1) he may not be the Chief Judge
of the circuit and (2) he may not participate in the appointment of
magistrates. 65
(c) A magistrate is not an elected officer but is appointed by the
circuit judges to serve at their pleasure.6 6 In Cook County, until and
unless changed by law, at least one-fourth of the magistrates will be
appointed from and reside in the area outside the corporate limits of
the City of Chicago." The General Assembly is to limit or define the
matters to be assigned to magistrates,6 ' and, until otherwise prescribed
by the General Assembly, the cases assigned to magistrates are to be
those within the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace and police
magistrates prior to January 1, 1964.69
The Judicial Article of 1961, in Paragraph 4 of its Schedule, pro-
vides:
(b) Circuit judges shall continue as circuit judges of the several circuit courts.
(c) In Cook County, the judges of the Superior Court, the Probate Court,
the County Court, and the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago
shall be circuit judges; the judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago, and the
judges of the several municipal, city, village and incorporated town courts shall
be associate judges of the Circuit Court.
(d) In counties other than the county of Cook, the county judges, probate
judges, and the judges of the municipal, city, village and incorporated town
courts shall be associate judges of the Circuit Court.
(e) Police magistrates and justices of the peace shall be magistrates of the
several circuit courts, and unless otherwise provided by law shall continue to
perform their non-judicial functions for the remainder of their respective terms.
It must be noted with care that insofar as decisions of cases are con-
cerned, a circuit judge, an associate judge and a magistrate stand on
the same footing; that is, a final judgment entered by an associate
65 Judicial Article of 1961, §9 8, 12.
66 Judiical Article of 1961, 12. It is of interest to note that for 36 years-from 1870
to 1906, when Section 60 of the Municipal Court of Chicago Act became operative-
all justices of the peace in the City of Chicago were appointed by the Governor, by and
with the advice of the Senate, but only upon the recommendation of a majority of the
Circuit, Superior, and County Courts. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 28; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 420 (1961).
67 Judicial Article of 1961, § 12.
68 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8.
69 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 9. Justices of the peace and police magis-
trates have the same jurisdiction. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. In civil cases, their jurisdiction
is limited to claims not exceeding $1,000.00 and, in criminal cases, to a fine not exceeding
$1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year. IiL. REV. STAT.
ch. 79, §§ 16, 165 (1961).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
judge is not reviewable by a circuit judge and a final judgment entered
by a magistrate is not reviewable either by an associate judge or by a
circuit judge.v0 The final judgment of each of said officers is review-
able only by the Appellate and Supreme Courts of Illinois.
7. Chief Judge of Circuit Court
Under the Judicial Articles of 1961, the circuit judges and associate
judges in each circuit will select one of the circuit judges to serve at
their pleasure as Chief Judge of such circuit.
71
The Chief Judge of the Circuit will, subject to the authority of the
Supreme Court, have general administrative authority in the Circuit
Court, including authority to provide for divisions, general or special-
ized, and for appropriate times and places of holding court.
72
8. All Courts Are Courts of Record
At present, justice of the peace courts and police magistrate courts
are the only judicial tribunals in Illinois which are not courts of
record. All other tribunals in the State are courts of record. Since the
Judicial Article of 1961 will, on January 1, 1964, abolish all justice of
the peace and police magistrate courts, 7a and "magistrates" of the
integrated circuit courts will be judicial officers of this court, the insti-
tution of courts not of record will become extinct, as there will exist
only the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court and the Circuit Courts,
all of which are courts of record. To bring the Illinois statute in har-
mony with the Judicial Article of 1961, it will be necessary to delete
70 However, as to interlocutory orders, one trial judge may review another trial
judge. In Jobnson v. Moon, 3 Ill.2d 561, 121 N.E.2d 774 (1954), the Supreme Court
said at page 564: "At the outset the administrator contends that Judge Ward lacked
authority to review the order entered by Judge Sbarbaro directing that the added
counterdefendants be brought into the case and permitting the filing of the counter-
claim. In our opinion, however, this contention was properly rejected by the Appellate
Court upon the authority of Roach v. Village of Winnetka, 366 11. 578, 581. See 1 111.
App.2d 6, 8, 9."
The law of Illinois is well established that it is error for more than one judge to
participate in the proceedings in a given case, but each step in the cause should be by
a single judge and this fact should appear from the record. Wayland v. City of Chi-
cago, 369 I11. 43, 15 N.E.2d 516 (1938); Courson v. Browning, 78 Ill. 208 (1875); Hall
v. Hamilton, 74 Il. 437 (1874); Harvey v. Van DeMark, 71 111. 117 (1873). The law as
above announced will continue under the Judicial Article of 1961.
71 Judicial Article of 1961, S 8.
72 Ibid.
73 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 5 (a).
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from the statute all references to courts of record and to eliminate the
distinction between courts of record and courts not of record.
74
9. Repeal of Other Constitutional Provisions
Article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 is entitled "Judicial
Department" and will be replaced by the Judicial Article of 1961.
However, Article VI is not the only Article which deals with the
Illinois judicial system. Thus:
(1) Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Bill of Rights") provides that "the trial of civil cases before
justices of the peace by a jury of less than twelve may be authorized
by law."
(2) Section 22 of Article IV of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Legislative Department") provides that no local oir special
law shall be passed regulating the "jurisdiction and duties of justices
of the peace" and "police magistrates."
(3) Section 34 of Article IV of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Legislative Department") provides for "municipal courts in
the city of Chicago" and, in 1905, the Municipal Court of Chicago
came into being by virtue of this constitutional authority."
(4) Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Counties") provides for the election of a "county judge"
and a "clerk of the circuit court," each with a four-year term of
office.
(5) Section 9 of Article X of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Counties") provides that the number of deputies and assist-
ants of the clerks of all the courts of record of Cook County "shall
be determined by rule of the circuit court, to be entered of record,
and their compensation shall be determined by the county board."
(6) Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution (which Article is
entitled "Counties") provides that the county board in counties other
than Cook "shall fix the compensation of all county officers, with the
amount of their necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other ex-
penses in such manner and subject to such limitations as may be pre-
scribed by law, and in all cases where fees are provided for, said
compensation shall be paid only out of, and shall in no instance exceed,
74 For example, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 181 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 28
(1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 51 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 1 (1961).
75 Veiss Memorial Hosp. v. Kroncke, 12 I11.2d 98, 145 N.E.2d 71 (1957); United
Biscuit Co. v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 407 111. 488,195 N.E.2d 439 (1950).
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the fees actually collected: Provided, that the compensation of no
officer shall be increased or diminished during his term of office. All
fees or allowances by them received, in access of their said compen-
sation, shall be paid into the County Treasury." By virtue of Section
8 of said Article X, the term "county officers" includes the county
clerk and the clerk of the circuit court.
As a result of the adoption of the Judicial Article of 1961, the
above mentioned Section 5 of Article II, Sections 22 and 34 of Article
IV and Sections 8, 9 and 10 of Article X of the Illinois Constitution
of 1870 will be repealed to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the Judicial Article of 1961. In City of Chicago v. Reeves, 76 -the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution (which Article is entitled "Amendments to the Consti-
tution"5 does not prohibit implied amendments of other Articles of
the Constitution relating to the same subject and necessarily resulting
from the express amendment of one Article.
10. Election of Judges
(a) Nomination by Party Convention or Primary and Election at
General Elections
At present there are employed in Illinois two statutory methods of
nomination of judicial candidates: (1) by each political party in
convention and (2) by a party primary. Judicial candidates for the
Supreme Court, circuit courts and the Superior Court of Cook County
are nominated by each political party in convention and judicial can-
didates for other courts are nominated by party primaries.77
At present there are employed in Illinois three types of elections for
judicial candidates: (1) general elections held on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November of even numbered years, (2)
judicial elections held on dates designated by the Constitution of 1870
or by statute, and (3) special elections designated by the Governor
to fill vacancies for the remainder of a term in excess of a year. Judges
of the Supreme Court and circuit courts are elected at judicial elec-
76 220 Il1. 274, 77 N.E.237 (1906).
77 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-1, 9-1 (1961). However, see Article 10 of The Election
Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1961), dealing with minor political parties, which pro-
vides that "[alny convention, caucus or meeting of qualified voters of any established
political party as herein defined may make one nomination for each office therein to
be filled at any election, for officers of such township, city, village, or incorporated
town, by causing a certificate of nomination to be filed with the clerk of such town-
ship, city, village or incorporated town." ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 46 § 10-1 (1961).
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tions.78 Some judges of the Superior Court of Cook County are elected
at judicial elections and some at general elections.79 Judges of county
and probate courts are elected at general elections.8 0 Judges of city,
village and town courts are elected at judicial elections.8' Judges of
the Municipal Court of Chicago are elected at general elections.8 2
Some judges of municipal courts (other than Chicago) are elected at
general and some at judicial elections.8 3
Under the Judicial Article of 1961, all judges will be "nominated
by party convention or primary and elected at general elections by
the electors in the respective judicial districts, judicial circuits, coun-
ties, or units. 8 4
Thus, Supreme and Appellate Court judges will be elected within
their respective judicial districts.8 5 Circuit court judges will be elected
within their respective judicial circuts.8 6 Associate judges (in counties
other than Cook) will be elected within their respective counties.8 7
For the purpose of electing associate judges in Cook County, the
county is divided into two election units-the City of Chicago as one
unit and the area in the County of Cook outside of the City of Chicago
as another unit.8
Consequently, judges of city, town, village and municipal courts,
who are now voted upon only by the electors of their respective mu-
nicipalities, will, under the Judicial Article of 1961, be voted upon
as associate judges by all the electors of their respective counties, ex-
cept that the judges of the city, town, village and municipal courts of
Cook County (other than associate judges of the Municipal Court of
Chicago) will be voted upon as associate judges by the electors of
that part of Cook County which is outside of the City of Chicago.
78 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6, 14; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-7 (1961).
7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-10 (1961 Supp.).
80 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 8; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-13 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 301 (1961).
81 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-33 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 337 (1961).
82 ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 46, S 2-33 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 364 (1961).
83 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-33 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 451 (1961).
84 Judicial Article of 1961, § 10. Section 13 of the Judicial Article of 1961 defines
"general election" as "the biennial election at which members of the General Assembly
are elected.
85 Judicial Article of 1961, § 3. 87 Ibid.
80 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8. 88 Ibid.
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(b) Commission of Judges
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that "[a]ll
judicial officers shall be commissioned by the governor."8 The Judi-
cial Article of 1961 makes no such provision. It will, therefore, be
necessary to provide by statute a method of certifying that a person
who was elected as a judge is such. In this connection, it may be noted
that, by statute, the Governor commissions clerks of court, county
clerks, county treasurers, county commissioners, sheriffs, coroners,
state's attorneys and notaries public.°0
(c) No Continua-nce in Office Until Successor is Qualified
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that "[a]ll
officers provided for in this article shall hold their officers [sic offices]
until their successors shall be qualified."'" In contrast, the Judicial
Article of 1961 provides: 92
Any judge who does not file a declaration within the time herein specified,
or, having filed, fails of re-election, shall vacate his office at the expiration of
his term, whether or not his successor, who shall be selected for a full term
pursuant to Section 10 of this Article, shall yet have qualified.
11. Apportionment of Associate Judges
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that there shall be at least
twelve associate judges elected from the area in Cook County outside
the City of Chicago and at least thirty-six associate judges from the
City of Chicago. In Cook County, the City of Chicago and the area
outside the City of Chicago shall be separate units for the election or
selection of associate judges. All associate judges from the area outside
of the City of Chicago shall run at large from that area and such area
89 ILL. CONST. art. VI, 5 29.
90 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 25, § 3; ch. 37, §§ 27, 311, 339, 369; ch. 35, § 3; ch. 36, § 3; ch. 34,
801; ch. 125, § 1; ch. 31, § 1; ch. 14, § 1; ch. 99, § 1 (1961).
91 ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 32.
92 Judicial Article of 1961, § 11.
93 At present, Cook County, outside of the City of Chicago, has 12 city, town, village
and municipal court judges, as follows: City Court of Chicago Heights-i; City
Court of Calumet City-i; City Court of Blue Island-I; Town Court of Cicero-2;
Village Court of Maywood-1; Village Court of Skokie-2; Municipal Court of Evan-
ston-2; Municipal Court of Oak Park-i; Municipal Court of Elmwood Park-1. The
Municipal Court of Chicago has 36. The Judicial Article of 1961 guarantees 48 associate
judges in Cook County as a minimum.
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apportionment of associate judges shall continue until changed by law.
There shall be at least one associate judge from each county.9 4
12. Selection and Tenure of Judges Subject to Future
Legislation and Referendum
The subject of selection and tenure of judges is a problem upon
which the contending parties in the Legislature were in hopeless con-
flict. A compromise was finally reached by inserting in the Judicial
Article of 1961 the following:9"
Provided, however, the General Assembly may provide by law for the selec-
tion and tenure of all judges provided herein as distinguished from nomination
and election by the electors, but no law establishing a method of selecting
judges and providing their tenure shall be adopted or amended except by a
vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each House, nor shall any method
of selecting judges and providing their tenure become law until the question
of the method of selection be first submitted to the electors at the next general
election. If a majority of those voting upon the question shall favor the method
of selection or tenure as submitted it shall then become law.
13. Filling Vacancy in Office of Judge
Section 32 of the Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 pro-
vides that vacancies in the office of judges shall be filled by election,
but where the unexpired term does not exceed one year, the vacancy
shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. On the other hand,
Section 10 of the Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[w]henever
a vacancy occurs in the office of judge, the vacancy shall be filled for
the unexpired portion of the term by the voters at an election as above
provided in this Section, or in such other manner as the General
Assembly may provide by law as set out in this Section and approved
by the electors." Thus, in the absence of future legislation approved
by referendum, as set forth in Section 10 of the Judicial Article of
1961, there will not be any gubernatorial appointment of judges, and
it will be impossible to hold a special election for judges to fill vacan-
cies because Section 10 of the Judicial Article of 1961 expressly pro.
vides for election of judges "at general elections" and Section 13 of
the Judicial Article of 1961 defines "general election" as "the biennial
election at which members of the General Assembly are elected."
94 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8.
95 Judicial Article of 1961, § 10.
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14. Judge's Qualifications
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 does not require
that judges be licensed attorneys at law, and, in fact, there have been
in Illinois many judges who were not lawyers. Even at present, there
are some county judges in downstate counties who are not lawyers.
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[n]o person shall be eligible
for the office of judge unless he shall be a citizen and licensed attorney-
at-law of this State, and a resident of the judicial district, circuit, coun-
ty or unit for which selected."""
15. Judge's Activities
The Judicial Article of 1961 places certain restrictions upon the
activities of judges, as follows: "Judges shall devote full time to their
judicial duties, shall not engage in the practice of Law or hold any
other office or position of profit under the United States or this State
or any municipal corporation or political subdivision of this State,
and shall not hold office in any political party.' 97
16. Terms of Office
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides for terms
of office as follows: Supreme Court judges, nine years;98 circuit judges,
six years;99 judges of the Superior Court of Cook County, six years;' 00
county judges, four years;' 0' judges of the probate court, four years; 1 2
all other officers, whose term of office is not otherwise provided in said
Article, four years. 10 3 By virtue of statute, the term of office of judges
of city, town and village courts, judges of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, and judges of municipal courts other than Chicago is six
years.10 4
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides:
The term of office of judges of the Supreme Court and of the Appellate
Court shall be ten years and of the circuit judges and associate judges of the
Circuit Courts six years.105
06 Judicial Article of 1961, § 15.
97 Judicial Article of 1961, § 16.
98 ILL. CONST. art. VI, S 6.
99 ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 12.
100 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 23. 10" ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
101 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. 104 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§337, 364, 451 (1961).
102 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 20. 10 Judicial Article of 1961, § 14.,
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17. Protection of Incumbent Judicial Officers
Although the Judicial Article of 1961 provides for three Supreme
Court judges to be elected from Cook County, 06 the seven incumbent
judges of the Supreme Court are allowed to continue in office and
to be re-elected until death, resignation, removal, retirement or rejec-
tion by the electorate.' 07
Judges in office on January 1, 1964, are not subject to compulsory
retirement at a prescribed age until after the expiration of their then
current terms'
018
The Judicial Article of 1961 requires all judges to be licensed
attorneys-at-law of this State, 10 9 and prohibits them from engaging in
certain activities."0 To enable county and other judges (some of
whom are not lawyers) to continue in office, it is provided that the
requirements governing eligibility for office shall not affect the right
of any incumbent to continue for the remainder of his existing term,
and that provisions concerning prohibited activities shall not apply,
for the remainder of such existing term, to a judge of a county, pro-
bate, city, village or incorporated town court, a justice of the peace
or police magistrate."
Any law reducing the number of judges of the Appellate Court in
any district or the number of circuit or associate judges in any circuit
will be without prejudice to the right of judges in office at the time
of its enactment to seek retention in office." 2
Any change made in the area of a district or circuit or the re-
apportionment of districts or circuits is not to affect the tenure in
office of any judge incumbent at the time such change or reapportion-
ment is made." 3
Although magistrates of the Circuit Courts are to be appointed by
the circuit judges, not elected," 4 incumbent justices of the peace and
police magistrates are to be magistrates of the Circuit Courts for the
remainder of their respective terms. 5
100 Judicial Article of 1961, §§ 3, 4.
107 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 13.
108 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 12 (c).
109 Judicial Article of 1961, § 15. 110 Judicial Article of 1961, § 16.
111 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 4(f). 112 Judicial Article of 1961, § 11.
113 Judicial Article of 1961, § 15. 114 Judicial Article of 1961, § 12.
115 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 4(e).
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Even incumbent Masters in Chancery and referees, whose offices
are completely abolished,11 may continue until the expiration of their
terms and may thereafter, by order of court, conclude matters in
which testimony has been received."1
18. Re-election of Judges
A Judge who has served a term in office is to be re-elected,' not
through nomination by party convention or primary, but is to be
submitted to the voters, on a special judicial ballot without party
designation, on the sole question whether he shall be retained in office
for another term. In such election, no judicial candidate may run against
him.
Section 11 of the Judicial Article of 1961 provides:
Not less than six months prior to the general election next preceding the
expiration of his term of office, any judge previously elected may file in the
office of the Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself,
and the Secretary of State, not less than 61 days prior to the election, shall
certify such candidacy to the proper election officials. At the election the name
of each judge who has filed such a declaration shall be submitted to the voters,
on a special judicial ballot without party designation, on the sole question
whether he shall be retained in office for another term. The elections shall be
conducted in the appropriate judicial districts, circuits, counties and units. The
affirmative votes of a majority of the voters voting on the question shall elect
him to the office for another term commencing the first Monday in December
following the election. Any judge who does not file a declaration within the
time herein specified, or, having filed, fails of re-election, shall vacate his office
at the expiration of his term, whether or not his successor who shall be selected
for a full term pursuant to Section 10 of this Article, shall yet have qualified." 8
It must be noted with care that the re-election must involve only a
judge's candidacy to succeed himself. Thus, a judge of the Appellate
Court who desires to fill a vacancy in a Supreme Court judgeship will
have to be "nominated by party convention or primary and elected
at general elections,"" 9 the same as if he had never been a judge be-
fore. Likewise, a circuit judge who desires to fill a vacancy in an
Appellate Court judgeship will have to be "nominated by party con-
vention or primary and elected at general elections," the same as if he
had never been a judge before. Similarly, an associate judge who de-
110 Judicial Article of 1961, S 8.
117 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 8.
118 As to filling vacancies, see subtopic 13-"Filling Vacancies in Office of Judge."
119 Judicial Article of 1961, § 10.
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sires to become a circuit judge will have to be "nominated by party
convention or primary and elected at general elections," the same as
if he had never been a judge before.
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides: 20
(a) Those elected judges in office on January 1, 1963 shall be entitled to seek
retention in office under Section 11 of this Article.
(b) The terms of all judges in office on January 1, 1963 expiring otherwise
than on the first Monday in December in an even numbered year are extended
to the first Monday in December after the general election following the date
at which such terms would otherwise expire. For the purpose of application of
any laws providing for an increase in judicial salaries, every judge whose term
is thus extended shall be regarded as commencing a new term on the date
prescribed by prior law for the election of his successor.
19. Judicial Salaries Paid by State
As to judicial salaries, the provisions contained in the Judicial Ar-
ticle of the Constitution of 1870 are partial and incomplete. Provision
is made therein for salaries of judges of the'Supreme Court with the
prohibition that "after said salaries shall be fixed by law, the salaries
of the judges in office shall not be increased or diminished during the
terms for which said judges have been elected.'' Provision is also
made in the Constitution of 1870 for salaries of the judges of the
Circuit Courts and the Superior Court of Cook County "out of the
state treasury, . . . and such further compensation, to be paid by the
county of Cook, as is or may be provided by law; such compensation
shall not be changed during their continuance in office.' 22 There is
nothing in the Constitution of 1870 as to salaries or compensation of
county judges, probate judges, judges of the city, village, town or
municipal courts, justices of the peace and police magistrates. These
matters are covered by statute and the salaries of these judicial officers
are paid from different sources, as follows: County and probate judges
are paid partially by the State and in part by their respective coun-
ties;1 13 judges of city, town and village courts are paid by the State; 124
judges of municipal courts are paid by their respective municipali-
ties; 125 justices of the peace, having become in 1961 county (instead
120 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 12.
121 ILL. CONST. art. VI, S 7.
122 ILL. CONrSr. art. VI, S 25.
123 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 53, S 5c (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 320 (1961).
124 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, 355 (1961).
125 ILu. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 363, 450 (1961).
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of township) officers and, having become in 1961 salaried (instead of
fee) officers, are paid by their respective counties; 126 police magis-
trates, having become in 1961 salaried officers, are paid by their re-
spective municipalities. 127
The Judicial Article of 1961 covers the above subject matter as
follows: '1S
Judges and magistrates shall receive for their services salaries provided by
law. The salaries of judges shall not be diminished during their respective terms
of office. Judicial officers may be paid such actual and necessary expenses as
may be provided by law. All salaries and expenses shall be paid by the State,
except that judges of the Appellate Court for the First District and circuit and
associate judges and magistrates of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall
receive such additional compensation from the county as may be provided by
law.
It is to be noted that under the Judicial Article of 1961, judicial
salaries may not be diminished during terms of office, but may-be
increased during terms of office.
20. Retired Judges
At present a retired judge may not render any judicial services. In
contrast, Federal judges who are retired may, with their consent, be
assigned judicial duties, 29 and many retired Federal judges have ren-
dered very valuable service. Patterned after the Federal statute, the
Judicial Article of 1961 provides:18 0
Any retired judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court
to judicial service, and while so serving shall receive the compensation appli-
cable to such service in lieu of retirement benefits, if any.' 8'
21. Assignment of Judges to Circuit Courts
By statute, effective January 1, 1934, the Supreme Court of Illinois
may assign judges of the circuit courts of the State and judges of the
Superior Court of Cook County to serve in courts other than their
own. 3 2 The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that the Supreme Court,
120 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 59.1 (1961).
127 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, SS 3, 13, 8 (1961).
128 Judicial Article of 1961, S 17.
129 28 U.S.C. 294 (1958).
1o Judicial Article of 1961, S 18.
131 See JUDICIAL RETIREMENT ANT) PENSION PLANS, American Judicature Society (1961).
132 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 5§ 72.30, 72.31 (1961).
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through the Chief Justice, in accordance with its rules, may make a
"temporary assignment of any judge to a court other than that for
which he was selected with the consent of the Chief Judge of the
Circuit to which such assignment is made.' 3
22. Assignment of Judges to Appellate Court
The Appellate Court is to have a total of twenty-four judges. 1 4
"The Supreme Court shall have authority to assign additional judges
to service in the Appellate Court from time to time as the business of
the court requires.""15 It is apparent that these "additional judges"
will have to be either Supreme Court judges, circuit judges or asso-
ciate judges. A judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to a
division of the Appellate Court in a district other than the district in
which the judge resides, but this requires the consent of a majority of
the Appellate Court judges of the district to which such assignment is
made." 6
23. Retirement, Suspension and Removal of Judges
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "the General Assembly
may provide by law for the retirement of judges automatically at a
prescribed age.""' 7
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that "It]he
General Assembly may, for cause entered on the journals, upon due
notice and opportunity of defense, remove from office any judge,
upon concurrence of three-fourths of all the members elected, of each
house."" 8
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides for the suspension or re-
moval of a judge through a commission of judges, as follows: 139
[S]ubject to rules of procedure to be established by the Supreme Court and
after notice and hearing, any judge may be retired for disability or suspended
without pay or removed for cause by a commission composed of one judge of
the Supreme Court selected by that court, two judges of the Appellate Court
selected by that court, and two circuit judges selected by the Supreme Court.
Such commission shall be convened by the Chief Justice upon order of the
Supreme Court or at the request of the Senate.
"33 Judicial Article of 1961, § 2.
134 judicial Article of 1961, § 6.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. 138 ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 30.
"3T Judicial Article of 1961, § 18. 139 Judicial Article of 1961, § 18.
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24. Administration of Courts
The Judicial Article of 1961 vests in the Supreme Court, through
the Chief Justice, in accordance with its rules, general administrative
authority over all courts in this State. 140
25. Administrative Director and Staff
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Illinois was, by statute,' authorized
to employ a Court Administrator for the courts of the State and a
Deputy Administrator for the courts of Cook County. Such offices
have been established and are now in operation, both serving at the
pleasure of the Supreme Court. The Judicial Article of 1961 provides
that "[t]he Supreme Court shall appoint an administrative director and
staff, who shall serve at its pleasure, to assist the Chief Justice in his
administrative duties.' ' 4 2
26. Judicial Conference
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides:4 3
All judges of courts of record, inferior to the Supreme Court, shall, on or
before the first day of June, of each year, report in writing to the judges of the
Supreme Court, such defects and omissions in the laws as their experience may
suggest; and the judges of the Supreme Court shall, on or before the first day
of January, of each year, report in writing to the Governor such defects and
omissions in the Constitution and laws as they may find to exist together with
appropriate forms of bills to cure such defects and omissions in the laws.
For a number of years the Illinois judiciary did not pay much
attention to the above constitutional requirement. However, in 1954,
the Supreme Court of Illinois called a judicial conference and did
likewise in the years of 1955, 1956 and 1957.1
On November 14, 1957, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted
Rule 56-1, reading as follows:145
A. There shall be a Judicial Conference to consider the business and the
problems pertaining to the administration of justice in this State, and to make
recommendations for its improvement.
140 Judicial Article of 1961, § 2. 142 Judicial Article of 1961, § 2.
141 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 23e-23n (1961). 143 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 31.
144 See "The Judicial Conference: A New 'Child' Comes of Age in Illinois" by the
Honorable Roger J. Kiley, then Judge of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First
District and now Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, 44 A.B.A.J., 835-8, 841 (1958).
145 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.56-1 (1961).
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B. The judges of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court, the circuit and
superior courts shall be members of the Conference.
C. The Supreme Court shall appoint an executive committee to assist it in
conducting the Judicial Conference.
(1) The committee shall consist of six judges of the circuit and superior
courts of Cook County and six judges of the circuit court from outside
Cook County. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be an ex
officio member of the committee.
(2) In the initial appointment of the committee, four members shall be
named for one year, four members for two years, and four members for
three years. Thereafter new members shall be appointed for a term of
three years.
(3) Each year the Supreme Court shall designate one of the members of the
committee to act as chairman.
(4) The committee shall meet at such time and such place as may be neces-
sary, or at the call of the Supreme Court.
(5) The committee shall recommend to the Supreme Court the appointment
of such other committees as are necessary to further the objectives of
the Conference.
(6) The committee shall, at least 60 days prior to the date on which the
Judicial Conference is to be held, submit to the Supreme Court a sug-
gested agenda for the annual meeting.
D. The Conference shall meet at least once each year at a place and on a
date to be designated by the Supreme Court.
E. The Supreme Court shall name a secretary of the Conference who need
not be a judge. The secretary shall have charge of keeping the records and
proceedings of the Conference. The secretary shall keep minutes of the meet-
ings of the Executive Committee and shall perform such other services as the
Supreme Court may from time to time direct.
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides: 146
The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for and shall convene an annual
judicial conference to consider the business of the several courts and to suggest
improvements in the administration of justice, and shall report thereon in writ-
ing to the General Assembly not later than January thirty-first in each legis-
lative year.
27. Original Jurisdiction of Reviewing Courts
A. Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 vests in the
Supreme Court "original jurisdiction in cases relating to the revenue,
in mandamus and habeas corpus.' 147 In construing this constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court held that it does not have original juris-
diction in prohibition . 48 The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that
146 Judicial Article of 1961, § 19. 147 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
148 People v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 173 111. 272, 50 N.E. 928 (1898); People v.
Circuit Court of Cook County, 169 1l. 201, 48 N.E. 717 (1897).
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"[t]he Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases relat-
ing to the revenue, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus."' 4 9 The
Judicial Article of 1961 also vests in the Supreme Court "such original
jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any
cause on review,"'51 which provision appears to be broader than the
language employed in the Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870,
but this new provision may be declaratory of what the law is now, as
the Supreme Court has issued writs of certiorari, prohibition and man-
damus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and this is frequently referred
to loosely as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. 1 1
B. Appellate Court
Section 11 of "An Act to establish appellate courts ' 152 provides:
The said appellate courts respectively, may issue the writ of mandamus to
cause a proper record to be duly certified, or to cause any other act to be done
which may be necessary to enforce the due administration of justice in all
matters, suits or proceedings, which could or might by appeal or writ of error
or in any other lawful manner, be brought within their respective jurisdictions.
... And the said appellate courts, respectively, may also issue writs of certiorari,
149 Judicial Article of 1961, 5 5.
150 Ibid.
151People v. Henry, 10 Il.2d 324, 139 N.E.2d 737 (1957); People v. Circuit Court
of Will County, 369 Ill. 438, 17 N.E.2d 46 (1938); People v. Superior Court of Cook
County, 359 Ill. 612, 195 N.E. 517 (1935); People v. Circuit Court of Washington Coun-
ty, 347 Ill. 34, 179 N.E. 441 (1931); People v. Superior Court of Cook County, 234 Ill.
186, 84 N.E. 875 (1908).
In Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 376 fI1. 183, 33 N.E.2d 485 (1941),
the Supreme Court held that a litigant may not submit to the reviewing court "original
evidence not offered in the trial court." The Schmidt case was followed in Atkins v.
Atkins, 393 Il. 202, 65 N.E.2d 801 (1946); Dogett v. North American Life Insurance
Company, 328 111. App. 613, 66 N.E.2d 747 (1946); Koepke v. Schumacher, 328 I1.
App. 113, 65 N.E.2d 224; People v. Ferror, 313 Ill. App. 202, 39 N.E.2d 707 (1942). In
Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N.E.2d 897 (1941), and in Walaite v. C., R. I. & P.
Ry. Co., 376 111. 59, 33 N.E.2d 119 (1941), the Supreme Court held that a motion for new
trial is addressed to the nisi prius court and, in the absence of a ruling on that motion
by the trial court, the Appellate Court, having appellate jurisdiction only, had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for new trial. Does the Judicial Article of 1961
change the law in these respects?
The provision that Illinois reviewing courts shall have "such original jurisdiction as
may be necessary to complete determination of any cause on review" is based upon
the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, Art. VI, § V, para. 3. In State v. Ferrell, 29 N.J.
Super. 183, 102 A.2d 70 (1954), and Ballurio v. Castellini, 28 N.J. Super 368, 100 A.2d
678 (1953), evidence was allowed to be introduced in the reviewing court, but this
power is not to be exercised in the absence of imperative necessity therefor. -Mancuso
v. Rothenberg, 67 N.J. Super 248, 170 A.2d 482 (1961); Appeal of Kresge-Newark, Inc.,
30 N.J. Super 489, 105 A.2d 12 (1954).
152 ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 37, § 35 (1961).
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error, supersedeas and all other writs not prohibited by law, which may be
necessary to enforce the due administration of justice in all matters within their
jurisdiction.
Under the above statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois has consist-
ently held that, while the Appellate Court has no original jurisdiction,
it has power to award writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition
to aid or protect its appellate jurisdiction.' 1 3 The Judicial Article of
1961 provides that "[t]he Appellate Court may exercise such original
jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any
cause on review."'15 4 This, however, may result in a continuation in the
operation of the law as heretofore.
28. Appeals from Circuit Court to Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that the
Supreme Court "shall have original jurisdiction in cases relating to
the revenue, in mandamus and habeas corpus, and appellate jurisdic-
tion in all other cases"' 55 and further provides for Appellate Courts
"to which such appeals and writs of error as the general assembly
may provide, may be prosecuted from circuit and other courts."' 5 6
Thus, there is no constitutional provision for a mandatory direct
appeal from any Illinois trial court to the Supreme Court in any case
whatsoever, and all direct appeals from a trial court to the Supreme
Court of Illinois are purely statutory and may be changed by the
Illinois Legislature at any time.'57
By virtue of statute, judgments and decrees of trial courts are re-
viewed directly by the Supreme Court in the following:
Cases in which a franchise is involved 158
Cases in which a freehold is involved' 59
Cases in which the validity of a statute is involved'0o
Cases in which a construction of the constitution is involved' 61
153 People v. Haas, 351 Ill. 68, 183 N.E 813 (1932); Hooper v. Rooney, 293 111. 370,
127 N.E. 711 (1920); People v. Pam, 276 111. 181, 114 N.E. 504 (1916); People v. Circuit
Court of Cook County, 169 Ill. 201, 48 N.E. 717 (1897).
154 Judicial Article of 1961, S 7.
1r- ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
156 ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 11.
157 Smith v. People, 98 Ill. 407 (1881); Fleischman v. Walker, 91 111. 318 (1878); Young
v. Stearns, 91 Ill. 221 (1878).
158 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 75 (1961).
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid. 11 Ibid.
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Cases relating to revenue1 62
Cases in which the State is interested as a party or otherwise' 65
Cases in which the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and the trial
judge certifies that in his opinion public interest requires an appeal to the
Supreme Court 64
Cases in which the validity of a county zoning ordinance or resolution is in-
volved and the trial judge certifies that in his opinion the public interest
requires an appeal to the Supreme Court1 65
Cases under the Public Utilities Act' 66
Cases under the Unemployment Compensation Act' 67
Cases under the Health and Safety Act 68
Cases under the Marketing Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Act' 69
Cases under the Detective and Detective Agencies Act 170
Cases under the Illinois Nursing Act' 71
Cases under the Pharmacy Act 1 72
Cases under the Chiropody Act' 7 3
Cases under the Optometry Act 1 74
Cases under the Consumer Act 175
Cases under the Rivers, Lakes and Streams Act' 76
Cases under the Cemetery Care Act 1 77
Cases under An Act concerning land titles (Torrens System) 178
Cases under the Illinois Professional Engineering Act 179
Cases under the Illinois Structural Engineering Act' 80
Cases under the State Housing Act' 8 '
Cases under the Medical Center District Act'82
Cases under the Oil Inspection Act 183
Cases under the Public Accountants Act18 4
Cases under the Illinois Land Surveyors Act'8 5
Cases under the Vocational Schools and Classes Act' 8 6
162 Ibid. 164 Ibid.
103 Ibid. 165 Ibid.
166 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111, § 73 (1961). The Illinois Motor Carrier Act adopts the pro-
visions of the Public Utility Act dealing with judicial review. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 ,
§ 282.25 (1961).
167 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 520, 685 (1961).
168 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 137.7, 137.8, 137.16 (1961).
169 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 154 (1961). 178 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 70 (1961).
170 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 608z (1961). 179 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 , § 57 (1961).
171 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 35.51 (1961). 180 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1311, § 1011 (1961).
172 ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 91, § 55.19 (1961). 181 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 671, § 183 (1961).
173 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 91, § 82b (1961). 182 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 130.7 (1961).
174 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 103.21 (1961). 183 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104, § 14h (1961).
175 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, § 43b (1961). 184 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101, § 45 (1961).
176 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 75a (1961). 185 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 133, § 47.04 (1961).
177 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 21, § 64.20 (1961). 186 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, § 17j.32 (1961).
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Cases under the Privately-Operated Colleges Act'8 7
Cases under the Business Schools Actss
Cases under the Illinois Aeronautics Act'8 9
Cases under the Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act 90
Cases under the Physical Therapy Act"''
Cases under the Dental Surgery Act192
Cases under the Illinois Plumbing License Law' 93
Cases under the Barbers Act'94
Cases under the Beauty Culturists Act' 95
Cases under the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act' 96
Cases under the Architects Act 97
Cases under the Drainage Codex98
Cases under the Election Code' 99
Cases involving registration as a voter 20
0
Cases wherein injunction is sought to restrain disbursement of public moneys20
Cases under the local improvement provision of the Illinois Municipal Code20 2
Cases involving the sale of realty for delinquent taxes 20 3
Cases under the Private Car Lines Companies Act 2 93a
Cases under the Water Well Contractor's License Act 2 °3b
Cases involving taxation of liquor 2 3C
Cases under the Airport Authorities Act 20 4
Cases under the Eminent Domain Act 2 5
Cases under the Motor Fuel Tax Act 20 6
Cases under the Retailers' Occupational Tax Act'0 7
187 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, S 133 (1961).
188 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, § 159 (1961). 193 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112,5 116.62 (1961).
189 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 , S 22.69 (1961). 194 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161, § 14.90 (1961).
100 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, 124.15 (1961). 195 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16J, S 26h (1961).
191 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, 22.25 (1961). 196 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1141, § 8h (1961).
192 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, S 62h (1961). 197 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 101, § 13h (1961).
198 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, §§ 3-25, 5-15, 8-10, 8-21, 10-7, 11-7, 11-17, 12-16 (1961).
199 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, J 23-30 (1961).
200 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 6-47, 6-52, 6-59, 6-60 (1961).
201 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, 1 16 (1961).
202 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 9-2-140 (1961).
203 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §718 (1961).
203a ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, S 372.4b (1961).
203bILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 , § 116.75 (1961).
203c ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 163c (1961). 205 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, § 12 (1961).
204 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 , 1 68.18 (1961). 200 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 432a (1961).
207 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 451 (1961). The Service Use Tax Act, the Service Occu-
pation Tax Act, and the Hotel Operator's Occupation Tax Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§§ 439.42, 439.112, 481b.37 (1961)] incorporate by reference Section 12 of the Retailers'
Occupational Tax Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, S 451 (1961)], thus making judgments in
proceedings under each of said three Acts also appealable directly to the Supreme Court.
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Cases under the Cigarette Tax Act2°8
Cases under the Cigarette Use Tax Act 20 9
Cases under the Business of Transmitting Messages Tax Act 210
Cases under the Consumption of Gas Tax Act 211
Cases under the Electricity Tax Act 212
Cases under the Revenue Act of 1939213
Cases under Community Currency Exchanges Act21 4
Cases under the Illinois Savings and Loan Act
215
Cases under the Wages of Employees on Public Works Act
216
Cases involving forfeiture under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act 217
Cases under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 18
Cases involving felonies210
Cases under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, only by leave of the Supreme
Court 22
0
Cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act, only by leave of the Supreme
Court221
Cases under the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, only by leave of the
Supreme Court222
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides: 22 3
Appeals from the final judgments of circuit courts shall lie directly to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right only (a) in cases involving revenue, (b)
in cases involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States
or of this State, (c) in cases of habeas corpus, and (d) by the defendant from
sentence in capital cases.
Let us examine these four categories:
(a) Revenue
The Illinois Civil Practice Act provides for a direct appeal from
the trial court to the Supreme Court in all cases "relating to reve-
208 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 453.8 (1961).
209 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 453.51 (1961).
210 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 467.12 (1961).
211 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 467.27 (1961).
212 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 479 (1961).
213 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 619 (1961). 217 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-31 (1961).
214 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 , § 52.2 (1961). 218 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, § 27 (1961).
215 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 864 (1961). 219 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7801 (1961).
216 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39s-9 (1961). 220 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §832 (1961).
"
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19 (1961). The Minimum Wage Act for women and
minors provides for review in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 198.13 (1961)], and the Act for Workmen's
Compensation or Occupational Diseases Insurance for Rejected Employers provides for
review in accordance withe provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act [ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1091 (1961)].
222 ILL. REV.,STAT. ch. 48, § 172.54 (1961). 223 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
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nue."224 The Judicial Article of 1961 brings about no change in this
category.
(b) Constitutionality
The Illinois Civil Practice Act provides for a direct appeal in all
cases in which "the validity of a statute or a construction of the
constitution is involved. '2 25 Under this statutory provision, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois has consistently held that where a construction
of the Constitution of the United States is involved, the Supreme
Court of Illinois has jurisdiction on a direct review. 22' Therefore, the
Judicial Article of 1961 brings about no change in this category.
(c) Habeas Corpus
At present, the Illinois law on this subject is as follows: Where a
person is held for the alleged commission of a crime and he proceeds
by habeas corpus to bring about his release, an order discharging the
prisoner or an order remanding the prisoner to the custody of the
officer who held him is not appealable by either party.227 However, in
a habeas corpus which is brought for the purpose of obtaining the
custody of a child, an order granting the custody of the child to the
petitioner or an order remanding the child to the custody of the re-
spondent is appealable. 28
224 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, $ 75 (1961).
225 Ibid.
226 Light v. Light, 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958); Pope v. Pope, 2 lU.2d 152, 117
N.E.2d 65 (1954); People v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 I11. 492, 63 N.E.2d 479 (1945); Atkins
v. Atkins, 386 111. 345, 54 N.E.2d 488 (1944); Groom v. Freyne Engineering Co., 374 I11.
113, 28 N.E.2d 274 (1940); Van Dyke v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 358 111. 458,
193 N.E. 490 (1934).,
The rule has long been settled in Illinois that if an appeal is taken to the Appellate
Court and errors are assigned of which the Appellate Court has jurisdiction, the party
taking the appeal is deemed to have waived all constitutional questions involved. People
v. Cosper, 5 Ill.2d 97, 125 N.E.2d 60 (1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 844; People v. Parker,
396 111. 583, 72 N.E.2d 848 (1947); People v. Billow, 377 Ill. 236, 36 N.E.2d 339 (1941).
Likewise, by taking an appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, all federal constitutional
questions are waived. Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Illi-
nois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447 (1936); Central Union Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190
(1925).
227 People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948); People v. MeAnally, 221 Ii. 66,
77 N.E. 544 (1906); Ex parte'Thompson, 93 111. 89 (1879).
Habeas corpus to determine the validity of extradition proceedings is an exception
to this rule and is reviewable by appeal to or writ of error from the Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, § 27 (1961).
228 People v. Weihe, 30 111. App.2d 361, 174 N.E.2d 897 (1961); Giacopelli v. The Crit-
tenton Home, 16 1ll.2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959); People v. Vingate, 376 I11. 244, 33
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The Judicial Article of 1961 which makes habeas corpus appealable
in all cases and by direct review to the Supreme Court is a complete in-
novation in the law of Illinois.22 s8 It should be noted, however, that the
Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 gives the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus,229 and that the Judicial Article
of 1961 does likewise.230
N.E.2d 467 (1941); People v. Sheehan, 373 111. 79, 25 N.E.2d 502 (1940); People v. Burr,
316 111. 166, 147 N.E. 47 (1925); Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Ill. 519, 71 N.E. 1077 (1904).
As to whether an order in a habeas corpus proceeding for the release of a person from
a state mental hospital is appealable, see Shamel v. Belinson, 15 Ill. App.2d 570, 147
N.E. 2d 90 (1958), which reviewed the proceeding, and People v. Kankakee State Hos-
pital Staff, 30 I11. App.2d 151, 174 N.E.2d 1 (1961), which held same unappealable.
228a In divorce and separate maintenance cases, petitions to obtain custody of chil-
dren seem to be in essence "habeas corpus" proceedings. Thus, in Jarrett v. Jarrett, 415
111. 126, 112 N.E.2d 694 (1953), a post-divorce petition was filed and the question in-
volved was "the jurisdiction of a circuit court to modify the custody provisions of a
divorce decree after the death of the spouse to whom the custody of the child was
awarded by he decree." The Supreme Court pointed out that "Habeas corpus was em-
ployed in People ex rel. Good v. Hoxie, 175 111. App. 563, and in Smith v. Bruner, 312
Ill. App. 658, to determine the custody of children after the death of the spouse to
whom custody had been awarded by a divorce decree." The Supreme Court then con-
cluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction whether the application for the change in
child custody "bore the title of the divorce case or the caption of an independent
habeas corpus proceeding." In People v. Jenkins, 34 Ill. App.2d 255, 180 N.E.2d 359
(1962), a petition for habeas corpus was filed by a father against maternal grand-
parents to obtain custody of a child, while in Kokotekian v. Kokotekian, 23 111. App.2d
171, 161 N.E.2d 712 (1959), a post-divorce petition was filed by a father against a
paternal grandmother to obtain custody of a child. The legal problems presented and
the results reached in the trial and reviewing courts were identical in both cases. It
seems that decisions pertaining to child custody in divorce and separate maintenance
cases will be appealable, under the Judicial Article of 1961, from the circuit courts di-
rectly to the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional right. Judicial Article of 1961,
§5.
A contested adoption proceeding involves a determination as to who is entitled to
the custody of the child. Is it not in essence a "habeas corpus" proceeding? If so, will
it be appealable, under the Judicial Aricle of 1961, from the circuit court directly to
the Supreme Court? See People v. Weihe, 30 Ill. App.2d 361, 174 N.E.2d 897 (1961),
where "habeas corpus" was successfully employed to annul an order of adoption.
A contested proceeding under the Family Court Act to decide whether a minor is a
dependent, neglected or delinquent child, involves a determination as to who is en-
titled to the custody of the child. Thus, in People v. Sempek, 12 Ill.2d 581, 147 N.E.2d
295 (1958), the Supreme Court said: "On the relation of one Ada M. Ryan three peti-
tions under the Family Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 23, par. 190 et seq.) were
filed in the circuit court of Cook County, seeking to take the three children of Ed-
ward and Betty Sempek from their parents and place them under the guardianship of
some suitable person to be appointed by the court." Is it not in essence a "habeas corpus"
proceeding? If so, will it be appealable, under the Judicial Article of 1961, from the
circuit courts directly to the Supreme Court?
229 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
230 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
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(d) Capital Cases
Prior to July 1, 1953, a writ of error in a non-capital criminal case
was issued as a matter of right, but a writ of error in a capital case
was issued only upon application to the Supreme Court itself, or to a
Justice thereof, if the court was in vacation, the allowance or refusal
of such writ of error in a capital case being discretionary with the
Court or Justice, and the Supreme Court has on many occasions denied
the writ of error in capital cases. 231 This discretionary writ of error in
capital cases was made a matter of right by the statutory amendment
which went into effect on July 1, 195 3232 Thus, capital cases are now
reviewable directly by the Supreme Court and will, under the Judi-
cial Article of 1961, likewise, be reviewable by the Supreme Court.2 33
A case involving an offense which is punishable by death or im-
prisonment remains a "capital case" even if the sentence is imprison-
ment and not death. In Fitzpatrick v. United States,234 the defendant
was indicted for murder. The Federal statute involved provided the
penalty of death for murder and further provided that the jury may
qualify the verdict by adding the words "without capital punishment."
A Federal statute also provided for direct review of the District Court
judgment by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of a
"conviction of a capital crime." The jury returned a verdict of guilty
"without capital punishment." The Government challenged the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, contending that since the sentence was
"without capital punishment," it was not "a conviction of a capital
231 In Bowers v. Green, 2 111. 42 (1832), the Supreme Court said: "At common law,
the only mode of removing a cause from an inferior court of record, to a superior court
for reversal, was by a writ of error, and this writ was a writ of right, which could not
be denied except in capital cases." In Unknown Heirs of Langworthy v. Banker, 23 I11.
484 (1860), the Supreme Court said: "A writ of error is a writ of right by the common
law, and lies in all cases, civil and criminal, except capital cases, but can, of course, be
regulated by statute." In Peak v. The People, 76 Ill. 289 (1875), the Supreme Court
quoted: "A writ of error is a writ of right by the common law, and lies in all cases, civil
and criminal, except capital cases, but can, of course be regulated by statute." In People
v. Wilson, 400 111. 461, 81 N.E.2d 211 (1948), the Supreme Court said: "In the case of a
defendant in the criminal case, who is adjudged to suffer capital punishment, he is not
entitled to a writ of error as a matter of right." In People v. Ross, 344 Ill. App. 407, 101
N.E.2d 112 (1951), the Court said: "writ of error, however, is a writ of right by the com-
mon law and lies in all cases, civil and criminal, except capital cases, but can, of course,
be regulated by statute."
232 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1961).
233 There are in Illinois only three capital offenses, namely, murder, aggravated kid-
napping for ransom and treason. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 5§ 9-1, 10-2, 30-1 (1961).
234 178 U.S. 304 (1900).
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crime." The Supreme Court overruled the Government's contention
and held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction on direct review
from the District Court because the case involved a "conviction of a
capital crime." The Court said:235
The test is not the punishment which is imposed but that which may be
imposed under the statute. 236 A conviction for murder, punishable with death,
is not the less a conviction for a capital crime by reason of the fact that the
jury, in a particular case, qualifies the punishment.23 7
In People v. St. Lucia,23s the defendant was charged with murder
and was given a life sentence. After verdict, he made application to be
admited to bail, contending that since he was not sentenced to death,
he was not involved in a "capital case" and was entitled to be released
on bail. The trial court overruled his contention and the Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed and said: 239
Plaintiff in error seeks to bring here the question of the refusal of the court
to admit him to bail after the verdict of the jury. Murder is a capital offense
under the constitution and the statute, whether judgment be imprisonment or
hanging, and is a case in which the defendant is not entitled to bail. The act
of June 25, 1917, (Laws of 1917, p. 338,) providing that a defendant convicted
of a criminal offense which under the law is bailable is entitled to a reasonable
time in which to make application for supersedeas and is entitled to bail in the
meantime, does not apply to capital cases.240
235 Id. at page 307.
236 Emphasis by the Supreme Court.
237 Followed in Good Shot v. United States, 179 U.S. 87 (1900), and Good Shot v.
United States, 104 F. 257 (C.A. 8th Cir., 1900).
In Caesar v. State, 127 Ga. 710, 57 S.E.66 (1907), the defendant was indicted for mur-
der which was punishable by death or imprisonment. The jury returned a verdict find-
ing defendant guilty of murder with a recommendation that he be imprisoned in the
penitentiary for life. The defendant sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court
of Georgia to review his life sentence. An amendment to the Georgia Constitution
vested the Supreme Court with jurisdiction "in all cases of conviction of a capital
felony" and created a Court of Appeals vesting it with jurisdiction in other cases.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that even though the sentence in the murder case
was life imprisonment, not death, it involved a "conviction of a capital felony" and the
Supreme Court (not the Court of Appeals) had jurisdiction.
The Caesar case was followed in Climer v. State, 78 Ga. App. 125, 126, 50 S.E.2d 633,(1948); Birdell v. State, 200 Ga. 785, 38 S.E.2d 589 (1946); Mika v. State, 196 Ga. 473,
26 S.E.2d 616 (1943); Dawson v. State, 130 Ga. 127, 133, 60 S.E. 315 (1907).
However, if the defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death
but is found guilty of a lesser crime which is not punishable by death, the case loses its
status as a capital case and becomes a non-capital case. Meriwether v. State, 189 Ga. 746,
8 S.E.2d 72 (1940); Rakes v. United States, 212 U.S. 55 (1909). Thus, if a defendant is
charged with murder through assault and battery, but is found guilty of assault and
battery only, the case, for the purpose of review, is not a capital case.
238 315 II1. 258, 146 N.E. 183 (1925). 239 1d. at page 269, 146 N.E. at 187.
240 Followed in People v. Schanda, 352 Ill. 36, 185 N.E. 183 (1933), where the de-
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At present, by statute,241 misdemeanors are reviewable by the
Appellate Courts and felonies by the Supreme Court. However, if a
constitutional question is involved in a misdemeanor, it is reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court. 42 Under the Judicial Article of 1961,
felonies, other than capital cases, will be reviewable by the Appellate
Court, not by the Supreme Court.24 However, in view of the protec-
tion afforded by the Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution 244 and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
to persons accused of crime, it is to be expected that a substantial num-
ber of criminal cases (other than capital cases) will be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court of Illinois because of the presence of a
State or Federal constitutional question. 45
29. In Other Cases Concurrence of General Assembly,
Governor and Supreme Court Necessary
The Judicial Article of 1961 limits direct review by the Supreme
Court to four categories: (a) revenue, (b) constitutionality, (c) ha-
fendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary
for 29 years.
The Illinois decision in People v. St. Lucia was followed in the case of In Re Berry,
198 Wash. 317, 88 P.2d 427 (1939), where the authorities with divergent views on the
problem are collected and discussed.
241 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 7802 (1961).
242 People v. Jackson, 22 ll.2d 382, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961); People v. Beeftink, 21 1ll.2d
282, 171 N.E.2d 632 (1961); People v. Burnett, 20 Ill.2d 624, 170 N.E.2d 546 (1960);
People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill.2d 232,170 N.E.2d 151 (1960); People v. Mayo, 19 11l.2d 136,
166 N.E.2d 440 (1960); People v. Watkins, 19 l.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); People v.
Berry, 17 1ll.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959); People v. West, 15 Il1.2d 171,154 N.E.2d 286
(1958); People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609 (1957); People v. Clark, 9 1ll.2d
400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954);
Thompson v. The People, 410 Ill. 256, 102 N.E.2d 315 (1951).
243 Judicial Article of 1961, S 7.
244 ILL. CONST. art. II.
245 An examination of volumes 18, 19, 20 and 21 Illinois, Second Series, shows that dur-
ing the year 1960 the Supreme Court of Illinois filed 84 opinions involving criminal
cases. Of this number, 7 were capital cases and 23 (other than the capital cases) involved
constitutional questions. Thus, it can be seen that the number of criminal cases which
will, under the Judicial Article of 1961, reach the Supreme Court on the basis of con-
situtional questions involved is likely to be substantial.
Furthermore, in view of the recent holdings by the Supreme Court of the United
States that convictions by State courts devoid of evidence constitute violations of "due
process of law" under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) and Thompson v. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199 (1960), it may be expected that "constitutional questions" will be raised
in more criminal cases than heretofore.
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beas corpus, and (d) capital cases, and then provides: "Subject to law
hereafter enacted, the Supreme Court has authority to provide by rule
for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts directly to the Su-
preme Court."24 It seems that to add another category for direct review
by the Supreme Court will require the concurrence of the General
Assembly, the Governor and the Supreme Court.246"'
30. Appeals from Appellate to Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides:24
Appeals from the Appellate Court sniall lie to the Supreme Court as a matter
of right only (a) in cases in which a question under the Constitution of the
United States or of this State arises for the first time in and as a result of the
action of the Appellate Court, and (b) upon the certification by a division of
the Appellate Court that a case decided by it involves a question of such im-
portance that it should be decided by the Supreme Court. Subject to rules,
appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in all other cases shall
be by leave of the Supreme Court.
Let us examine these three categories:
(a) Constitutionality First Arising in Appellate Court
Prior to January 1, 1956, writs of error issued as a matter of consti-
tutional right by the Supreme Court to the Appellate Court where a
246 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
The express limitation of "Subject to law hereafter enacted" is not the consequence
of inadvertent draftsmanship. It is the result of a conscious political battle on the sub-
ject. In the 1957 draft of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations, the language
used was: "The Supreme Court has exclusive authority to provide by rule for appeal in
other cases from the circuit courts directly to the Supreme Court." The General As-
sembly rejected this language and inserted instead: "Subject to law hereafter enacted,
the Supreme Court has authority to provide by rule for appeal in other cases from the
circuit courts directly to the Supreme Court." (S.J. Res. No. 47, Laws 1957, p. 2910.)
The same political battle was repeated in 1961, when the draft of the Illinois State and
Chicago Bar Associations used the following language: "The Supreme Court has ex-
clusive authority to provide by rule for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts
directly to the Supreme Court." The General Assembly rejected this language and
inserted instead: "Subject to law hereafter enacted, the Supreme Court has authority to
provide by rule for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts directly to the Su-
preme Court." (H.J. Res. 39, Laws 1961, p. 3918.)
The above requirement is entirely dissimilar to the provision of the Federal statutes
that rules made by the Supreme Court of the United States "shall not take effect until
they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice .... and until the expiration
of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771 (1958).
246a Some persons contend that under the above quoted provision the Supreme
Court will have authority to add by rule a category for direct appeal from the circuit
courts to the Supreme Court and said rule will remain valid until the Legislature and
Governor invalidate it by statute.
247 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
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constitutional question was not involved in the trial court but arose for
the first time in the Appellate Court, in which situation the right to a
writ of error existed whether the order to be reviewed was final or
interlocutory.248 Since January 1, 1956, this is available by appeal. 40
Therefore, the Judicial Article of 1961 brings about no change in this
category.
On the other hand, prior to January 1, 1956, writs of error issued,
as a matter of constitutional right, by the Supreme Court to the
Appellate Court in cases where by the decision of the trial court a
franchise or freehold was not involved, but by the decision of the
Appellate Court a franchise or freehold became involved for the first
time in that court,' 5° and since January 1, 1956, this review is by
appeal.25 1 Under the Judicial Article of 1961, cases involving a fran-
chise or a freehold are not singled out for any special treatment, as
they were in the Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870, and deci-
sions of the Appellate Court in such cases will be reviewable by the
Supreme Court only by the three methods available in all other cases.
(b) Certificate of Importance by Appellate Court
The Appellate Court Act 52 and the Civil Practice Act253 provide
for an appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court by a
certificate of importance from the Appellate Court that the case in-
volves a question of such importance that it should be passed upon by
the Supreme Court.2 54 However, the Appellate Court has no authority
to grant a certificate of importance unless the order entered by the
Appellate Court is final.255 An order dismissing an appeal is a final
order.256 An order of affirmance or reversal, without remandment, or
an order remanding the cause to the trial court with directions to enter
248 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11. Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Il. 25, 1 N.E.2d 220
(1935); Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Inv. Co., 309 11. 103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923); Jones
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 231 111. 302, 83 N.E. 215 (1907).
240 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 74(3) (1961). People v. Scott, 19 Ill.2d 500, 167 N.E.2d 194
(1960); In re Estate of Green, 16 I1l.2d 598, 158 N.E2d 610 (1959); People v. Flynn, 13
Ill.2d 368, 148 N.E.2d 767 (1958).
250 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11. Altschuler v. Altschuler, 410 111. 169, 101 N.E.2d 552
(1951).
251 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 74(3) (1961). 253 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 75 (1961).
2 5 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 32 (1961). 254 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 75 (1961).
255 Dowdall v. Hutchens, 347 Ill. 326, 179 N.E. 858 (1932); People v. Brown, 272 II.
146, 111 N.E. 557 (1916).
256 Spivey Bldg. Corp. v. Illinois Iowa Power Co., 375 Ill. 128, 30 N.E.2d 641 (1940).
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a particular judgment or decree is a final order.257 However, an order
reversing and remanding to the trial court for a new trial or hearing is
not a final order.25 8
It must be observed with care that in providing for appeals from the
circuit courts to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Article of 1961 re-
quires that there be "final judgments. ' 259 Likewise, in providing for
appeals from the circuit courts to the Appellate Courts, the require-
ment is that there be "final judgments."26 0 On the other hand, in pro-
viding for appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court no
final judgments are required.61
Insofar as appeal by certificate of importance is concerned, the
Judicial Article of 1961 follows the present practice, except that the
judgment of the Appellate Court will not have to be final for the pur-
pose of review by the Supreme Court. Thus, in a case where the Apel-
late Court reverses the circuit court and remands the cause for a new
trial, under the present practice, the Appellate Court may not grant
a certificate of importance for review by the Supreme Court, whereas
under the Judicial Article of 1961, the Appellate Court will be able to
do so. It is apparent that the reviewability of a case of such importance
should not be contingent upon the technicality of finality or lack of
finality and the provision on the subject in the Judicial Article of 1961
is superior to that of the present practice.
257 Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 15 I11.2d 313, 155 N.E.2d 14 (1959); Thomas v.
Richards, 13 Ill.2d 311, 148 N.E.2d 740 (1958); Chicago College of Osteopathy v. Puffer,
5 Ill.2d 441, 126 N.E.2d 26 (1955); Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952);
Morris v. Beatty, 390 Ill. 568, 62 N.E.2d 478 (1945); Vick v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n,
292 I11. App. 341, 11 N.E.2d 46 (1937); Mitchell v. King, 187 Ill 452, 55 N.E. 310 (1900);
Englewood Connecting Ry. v. Chicago & E.I.R., 117 Ill. 611, 6 N.E. 684 (1886); Joliet &
C.R.R. v. Healy, 94 M. 416 (1880).
258 Larson v. Larson, 19 1ll.2d 200, 166 N.E.2d 561 (1960); People v. Stanard, 9 Ill.2d
372, 137 N.E.2d 829 (1956); Lees v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 409 I11. 536, 100 N.E.2d 653
(1951); Cory Corporation v. Fitzgerald, 403 Ill. 409, 86 N.E.2d 363 (1949); Cowen v.
Harding Hotel Co., 396 I11. 477, 72 N.E.2d 177 (1947); Anderson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 390 111. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562 (1945); Dowdall v. Hutchens, 347 Ill. 326, 179 N.E.
858 (1932); People v. Board of Education, 275 11. 195, 113 N.E. 965 (1916). An order of
the Appellate Court holding that count one of a two count complaint stated a cause of
action and reversing and remanding the cause to the trial court as to said count one is
not final and appealable as to this count, and the order as to count one may not be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Young v. Wilkinson, 18 Ill.2d 428, 164 N.E.2d 39
(1960).
259 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
260 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7.
61 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
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(c) Leave to Appeal by Supreme Court
The Appellate Court Act 262 and the Civil 'Practice Act263 provide
for appeal from the Appellate to the Supreme Court by leave of the
Supreme Court, but again require finality of the Appellate Court
judgment with a provision for the striking of the "portion of the
judgment of the Appellate Court remanding the cause for new trial or
hearing. "'264
As to this method of review, the Judicial Article of 1961 provides
that "[s]ubject to rules, appeals from the Appellate Court to the Su-
preme Court in all other cases shall be by leave of the Supreme
Court."265 Under this provision, the Supreme Court will have very
broad powers and may make any rule it sees fit, including the aban-
donment of the present statutory policy of finality for the review of
an Appellate Court judgment by the Supreme Court.
When a petition is presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois for
leave to appeal from a decision of the Appellate Court, the Supreme
Court of Illinois is confronted with considerations similar to those
which face the Supreme Court of the United States when a petition for
certiorari is presented to it for review of a decision of a United States
Court of Appeals. In the latter situation, when there were presented
important issues fundamental to the further conduct of the litigation,
the Supreme Court of the United States on a number of occasions has
granted certiorari and reviewed the case despite the fact that the order
of the Court of Appeals was interlocutory. 6 The federal policy seems
wiser and more workable than the present Illinois practice.
262 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 32 (1961). 263 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 75 (1961).
264 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 75 (1961). See Gannon v, Chicago, M. & St. P. & P. Ry.,
22 Ill.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961), and Petty v. Illinois Central R.R., 11 Ill.2d 485, 144
N.E.2d 601 (1957), where the Supreme Court remanded the causes to the Appellate
Court with directions to reinstate the remanding orders which had been stricken by the
Appellate Court. See also the majority and minority opinions in John v. Tribune Co.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois on January 23, 1962, Docket No. 36450, and
People ex rel Wabash Railroad Co. v. Hoffman, decided by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois on March 23, 1962, Docket No. 36926, where a writ of mandamus was granted
by the Supreme Court of Illinois directed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, involving
remanding orders of Appellate Courts.
265 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
266 Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445
(1956); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In connection with the review of Appellate Court judgments by the
Supreme Court, it should be noted that the Criminal Code267 provides
that "misdemeanors" shall be reviewed by the Appellate Court and
"felonies" by the Supreme Court. Defendants whose misdemeanors are
reviewed by the Appellate Court have, under the Judicial Article of
the Constitution of 1870, an absolute right to a further review by the
Supreme Court.0 This mode of mandatory review of an Appellate
Court judgment by the Supreme Court will not exist under the Judi-
cial Article of 1961, and defendants in criminal cases reviewed by the
Appellate Court will, in order to reach the Supreme Court, have to
resort to the above discussed three methods, namely, (a) constitu-
tionality first arising in Appellate Court, (b) certificate of importance
by the Appellate Court, and (c) leave to appeal by the Supreme
Court, and none other.
31. Appeal from Final Judgment of Circuit Court
Is a Constitutional Right in All Cases
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides for
Appellate Courts "to which such appeals and writs of error as the
general assembly may provide, may be prosecuted from the circuit and
other courts. ' 26 ' Thus, at present, appeals are purely statutory, de-
pendent for their availability upon the General Assembly.27 0 Similarly,
in a statutory proceeding where a statute expressly provides that the
decision of the trial court shall be conclusive, the proceeding is not
reviewable,2 '1 and in a statutory proceeding where no appeal or writ
of error is provided for, the proceeding is not reviewable.7 2 This
policy is completely changed by the Judicial Article of 1961, as ap-
267 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7801 (1961).
208 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11; People v. Booth, 390 I1. 330, 61 N.E.2d 370 (1945); Smith
v. People, 98 111. 407 (1881).
269 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
270 The right of appeal is purely statutory and may be exercised only within the
limits prescribed by legislative grant. Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 lll.2d 45, 47,
147 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1958). The right of appeal is purely statutory. People v. Bristow,
391 Il1. 101, 123, 62 N.E.2d 545, 555 (1945).
271 People v. Dusher, 411 I11. 535, 104 N.E.2d 775 (1952).
272 People v. Ross, 407 Ill. 199, 95 N.E.2d 61 (1950); People v. Cornelius, 392 Ill. 599,
65 N.E.2d 439 (1946); Ekendahl v. Svolos, 388 I11. 412, 58 N.E.2d 585 (1944); City of
Chicago v. Steamship Lines, 328 I11. 309, 159 N.E. 301 (1927); Phelps v. Board of
Appeals, 325 Ill. 625, 156 N.E. 826 (1927); In re Forbes, 316 Ill. 141, 146 N.E. 448 (1925);
People v. Ross, 344 Ill. App. 407, 101 N.E.2d 112 (1951); People v. Cornelius, 332 Il.
App. 271, 74 N.E.2d 900 (1947).
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peals from final judgments of the circuit courts, involving (a) rev-
enue, (b) constitutionality, (c) habeas corpus, and (d) capital cases
are reviewable by the Supreme Court "as a matter of right" guaranteed
by the Constitution273 and "[i]n all cases, other than those appealable
directly to the Supreme Court, appeals from final judgments of a Cir-
cuit Court lie as a matter of right to the Appellate Court, "274 again
guaranteed by the Constitution, effective January 1, 1964.
32. What Order is a "Final Judgment" is a Constitutional Question
The Judicial Article of 1961 expressly guarantees the right of ap-
peal to the Supreme Court from "final judgments" of the circuit courts
in four enumerated categories27' and further guarantees the right of
appeal to the Appellate Court from "final judgments" in "all cases,"
other than those appealable directly to the Supreme Court.
27 6
Section 50 (2), which was added to the Illinois Civil Practice Act in
1955, effective January 1, 1956, reads as follows:
If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, the
court may enter a final order, judgment or decree as to one or more but fewer
than all of the parties or claims only upon an express finding that there is no
just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. In the absence of that finding,
any order, judgment or decree which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not terminate the
action, is not enforceable or appealable, and is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of an order, judgment or decree adjudicating all the claims,
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Thus, prior to 1956, an order was final which determined the
rights of the parties and referred the cause to a Master in Chancery to
state an account, 27 whereas subsequent to January 1, 1956, the finality
of such order is left, by the Legislature, to the discretion of the trial
judge, and if the trial judge does not state that "there is no just reason
for delaying enforcement or appeal" (which is purely a matter of
opinion upon which various judges may differ), the judgment is not
final. 278 Likewise, prior to 1956, a decree which found the interest of
the parties and ordered partition was final and appealable, although the
question whether the premises were susceptible to division or sale was
273 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5. 27, Id. § 5.
274 Id. § 7. 276 Id. §7.
277 Barnhart v. Bamhart, 415 Il1. 303, 114 N.E.2d 378 (1953); Altschuler v. Alt-
schuler, 399 l11. 559, 78 N.E.2d 225 (1948).
278 Hanley v. Hanley, 13 Il.2d 209, 148 N.E.2d 792 (1958); Ariola v. Nigro, 13 1ll.2d
200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
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left for future determination,79 whereas subsequent to January 1, 1956,
the finality of such decree of partition is left to the whim of the trial
judge as to whether he will state that in his opinion "there is no just
reason for delaying enforcement or appeal," and if the trial judge re-
fuses to do so, appealability may be delayed for years. 210
Since appeal at present in Illinois is purely statutory and there is no
constitutional requirement that it be made available, the Legislature
may impose conditions or restrictions thereon, but, under the Judicial
Article of 1961, appeals from "final judgments" are a constitutional
right,28 ' and neither the Legislature nor the Supreme Court may place
any restriction thereon. It may reasonably be contended that, under
the Judicial Article of 1961, Section 50(2) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act, which became effective on January 1, 1956, will be unconstitu-
tional and that finality will have to be determined as it was prior to
January 1, 1956, without the statutory restriction thereon. On the
other hand, there is room for the contention that the framers of the
Judicial Article of 1961 used the term "final judgment" as defined in
Section 50(2) of the Civil Practice Act. The acceptance of this view
would practically make Section 50 (2) a part of the Illinois Constitution
and would remain unalterable by the Legislature or the courts except
through a constitutional amendment. In view of this grave problem
which lies at the base of a large number of appeals, repeal of Section
50 (2) must be given prompt, serious and careful consideration. Atten-
tion may also be given to the possibility that while Section 50 (2) of the
Civil Practice Act, as a legislative provision, would be unconstitutional,
this provision (which results in the postponement of the appeal period),
if promulgated as a rule of the Supreme Court, may be valid under the
constitutional mandate that "[t]he Supreme Court shall provide by rule
for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. '2 82
33. Legislature Deprived of Power to Control Right of Appeal
from Circuit and Appellate Courts
A careful examination of the Judicial Article of 1961 shows that the
Legislature will have no power to control the right of appeal from
279 Rabe v. Rabe, 386 Ill. 600, 54 N.E.2d 518 (1944); Hardin v. Wolf, 318 111. 48, 148
N.E. 868 (1925).
280 Getzelman v. Kohler, 14 I1l.2d 396, 152 N.E.2d 833 (1958). As to what constituted
"appealable orders" prior to January 1, 1956, see FINS, ILLINOIS PROCEDURE 609-23 (1950).
281 Judicial Article of 1961, §§ 5, 7. 282 Id. S
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either interlocutory or final judgments of the circuit courts to the
Supreme or Appellate Courts or from the Appellate Court to the Su-
preme Court.83 Thus:
1. An appeal from a final judgment involving revenue is taken from
the circuit court to the Supreme Court "as a matter of right" guaran-
teed by the Judicial Article of 196 1.284
2. An appeal from a final judgment involving a State or Federal
Constitutional question is taken from the circuit court to the Supreme
Court "as a matter of right" guaranteed by the Judicial Article of
196 1.285
3. An appeal from a final judgment in habeas corpus is taken from
the circuit court to the Supreme Court "as a matter of right" guaran-
teed by the Judicial Article of 1961. s5
4. An appeal by a defendant from a sentence in a capital case is
taken from the circuit court to the Supreme Court "as a matter of
right" guaranteed by the Judicial Article of 1961.287
5. Appeals in "all cases" (other than the above specific four cate-
gories) from final judgments are taken from the circuit court to the
Appellate Court "as a matter of right" guaranteed by the Judicial
Article of 1961.288
6. Appeals from interlocutory orders are, by the Judicial Article of
1961, taken away from the control of the Legislature and vested in
the Supreme Court exclusively by the following provision: "The Su-
preme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court
from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court. ' 289 The limita-
tion that an interlocutory appeal be taken to the Appellate Court only
is in accord with the present practice under Section 78 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act 290 whereby an interlocutory appeal may be taken
283 Section 8 of the Judicial Article of 1961 provides for direct appeal from the final
judgments of the circuit courts to the Supreme Court in cases involving (a) revenue,
(b) constitutionality, (c) habeas corpus, and (d) capital cases, and then states that
"[s]ubject to law hereafter enacted, the Supreme Court has authority to provide by rule
for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts directly to the Supreme Court.'! This
"other cases" category is the only mode of appeal concerning which the Legislature
will have an opporunity to participate in the exercise of its choice.
284 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5. 280 Ibid.
285 Ibid. 287 Ibid.
288 Id. S 7. See subtopic 29 supra, as to possibility of additional categories for direct
appeal from Circuit to Supreme Court.
289 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7. 290 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 78 (1961).
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only to the Appellate Court and not to the Supreme Court, even
though the issues involve a franchise, a freehold, the validity of a
statute, the construction of the Constitution, the validity of a munic-
ipal ordinance, the validity of a county zoning ordinance or resolu-
tion, revenue, or the interest of the state,291 and Section 78(6) of the
Civil Practice Act provides that where an appeal is taken from such an
interlocutory order to the Appellate Court, "[t]he order or judgment
of the Appellate Court upon the appeal is not reviewable. ' '292
7. An appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in a
case involving a State or Federal constitutional question which arises
for the first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court
is "a matter of right" guaranteed by the Judicial Article of 1961.293
8. An appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court by a
certificate of importance of the Appellate Court is "a matter of right"
guaranteed by the Judicial Article of 196 1.294
9. An appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court by
leave of the Supreme Court is, by the Judicial Article of 1961, "[s]ub-
ject to rules" of the Supreme Court,2 5 and is beyond the control of
the Illinois Legislature.
10. At present, the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition
for leave to appeal is set forth in the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 296 but
the Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall
provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. 29 7 Thus, the
291 Seagram Distillers Co. v. Armanetti, 19 Ill. App.2d 575, 154 N.E.2d 866 (1958);
People v. Kostaken, 10 l.2d 549, 141 N.E.2d 44 (1957); Webb v. Marodas, 268
I11. App. 338 (1932); Bistor v. McDonough, 262 Il1. App. 404 (1931); Klever Shampay
Karpet Kleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 238 I11. App. 291 (1925); Murray v. Hag-
man, 315 Ill. 437, 146 N.E. 472 (1925); People v. Sears, 230 111 .App. 484 (1923); Mobile
& O.R.R. v. Fraser, 169 11. App. 210 (1912); New Ohio Washed Coal Co. v. Coal Belt
R.R., 116 11. App. 153 (1904).
292 Cory Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 403 I11. 409, 86 N.E.2d 363 (1949); Naprawa v. Chicago
Flat Janitor's Union, 382 I11. 124, 46 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Smith v. Bunge, 358 I11. 229, 193
N.E. 122 (1934). "The statute does no more than grant an immediate right to review
the order itself; it does not change the interlocutory character of the order. Thejudgment of an Appellate Court reviewing such an order may therefore itself be re-
viewed as a part of the case after there has been a final adjudication. See Town of Van-
dalia v. St. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute Railroad Co., 209 I11. 73, 81." Firebaugh v.
McGovern, 404 I11. 143, 147-48, 88 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1949); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
5 lll.2d 135,125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
203 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5.
294 Ibid. 296 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 75-77 (1961).
295 Ibid. 297 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7.
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setting of the time for the prosecution of appeals is vested in the Su-
preme Court exclusively.
In view of the fact that the Illinois Legislature will no longer have
power to control the right of appeal from the circuit courts and
Appellate Court and in order to bring the Illinois Civil Practice Act
into harmony with the Judicial Article of 1961, Article VIII-Appel-
late Practice (constituting Sections 74 to and including 94) of the
Civil Practice Act will have to be meticulously re-examined. For
example:
(1) Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act (dealing with jurisdiction
of Appellate and Supreme Courts) will have to be repealed as incon-
sistent with the Judicial Article of 1961.
(2) Section 78 of the Civil Practice Act (dealing with interlocu-
tory appeals) will have to be repealed and a rule of the Supreme Court
substituted therefor.
(3) Sections 79, 84, 85 and 90 of the Civil Practice Act (granting
the Supreme Court power to make rules pertaining to appellate prac-
tice) should be repealed as superfluous in view of the provision of the
Judicial Article of 1961 that "[t]he Supreme Court shall provide by
rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals."
(4) Sections 86 (dealing with transfer of cases from Appellate to
Supreme Court and vice-versa) and 86.1 (dealing with pleas in review-
ing courts) of the Civil Practice Act should be repealed as already
covered by Supreme Court Rules 47 and 70, respectively.
Furthermore, all the other provisions for appeal contained in the
various Acts throughout the Illinois Statute book are unnecessary and
should be repealed as surplusage,2 98 including sub-sections 72(6) and
73 (7) of the Civil Practice Act.
That part of Sections 68.1 (4) and 68.3 (2) of the Civil Practice Act
(enacted in 1955 and effective January 1, 1956) which provides that
,, 298 See Adoption of Children, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-20 (1961); Arbitration and
Awards, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 9, 5 118 (1961); Attachment, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 40
(1961); Attachment of Water Craft, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 12, § 29 (1961); Ejectment, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 45, S 37 (1961); Forcibe Entry and Detainer, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 19
(1961); Garnishment, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, § 86 (1961); Mandamus, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 87, S 10 (1961); Replevin, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, S 21 (1961); Trust Estates, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 52b (1961); Municipal Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 4-9-1, 4-9-2,
5-9-56, 7-1-4, 9-3-20, 9-3-43, 10-9-63 (1961); Eminent Domain, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47,
§ 14 (1961); Escheats, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 6 (1961); State Housing, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 671, § 179 (1961); Neighborhood Redevelopment, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 672, § 285
(1961); Foreign Judgments, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 98 (1961); Mental Health Code,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 2-4 (1961); Oil and Gas, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104, § 71 (1961).
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the filing of a post trial motion stays the appeal period until the court
rules upon the motion should be repealed and substitution therefor
made by rule of the Supreme Court so as to comply with the provi-
sion of the Judicial Article of 1961 that "[tihe Supreme Court shall
provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. '29 9 However,
if these two specified statutory provisions were held unconstitutional,
no change in the law would be effected, as the law prior to 195 6 was that
a motion to vacate or set aside a judgment or decree stayed the appeal
time until the court ruled on the motion. 00
34. Appeal by State in Criminal Cases
In American jurisdictions there is a complete lack of unanimity on
the question as to whether and in what situations the sovereign may
seek a review from a decision in favor of a defendant in a criminal
case.8 ' Prior to 1933, the State of Illinois had no right of review in
any criminal case."0 2 By virtue of Section 17 of Division 13 of the
Criminal Code, 0 8 as amended in 1933, the State of Illinois may sue out
writs of error to review final judgments in criminal cases in two situ-
ations: 804
(1) where the sufficiency of the indictment or information is chal-
lenged by motion to quash prior to plea and the motion is sustained.
(2) where the indictment or information is attacked by motion in
arrest of judgment after verdict of a jury or finding of the court, the
299 Judicial Article of 1961, S 7.
800 "If a party in interest in any judgment or decree which is final and appealable
files a motion to vacate or set aside the same, the motion stays the running of the time
within which the notice of appeal must be filed, and if the motion is disposed of on its
merits during the thirty-day period or thereafter, the time for filing of a notice of
appeal begins to run from the date such motion is disposed of." Corwin v. Rheims, 390
111. 205,216,61 N.E.2d 40,44 (1945).
801 See Dowling, Extending the State's Right to Appeal In Criminal Cases in Illinois,
42 CHI. B. RycoRD 361 (1961); Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 71 (1959); Kronenberg, Right of a State to Appeal in Criminal
Cases, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 473 (1959); Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486 (1927); Constitutionality of Statute Permitting Appeal by State
in Criminal Case, 113 A.L.R. 636 and 157 A.L.R. 1065.
302 People v. Barber, 348 M11. 40, 180 N.E. 633 (1932); People v. John York Co., 80
Ill. App. 162 (1898); People v. Miner, 144111. 308, 33 N.E. 40 (1893); People v. Glodo, 12
I11. App. 348 (1883); People v. Royal, 1 Scam. 557 (1839); People v. Dill, I Scam, 257
(1836).
803 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 747 (1961).
304 People v. Vitale, 364 111. 589, 5 N.E.2d 474 (1936). See FiNs, APPEALS AND WRrTS
OF ERROR IN ILLINOIS 44-51 (11th ed.-1962).
ILLINOIS JUDICIAL ARTICLE L5 1
indictment or information is searched and found wanting in some one
or more material requirements, the motion is granted and the indict-
ment or information set aside.
In 1961, the above statute was amended to provide that the State of
Illinois may sue out interlocutory writs of error in criminal cases in
three situations:
(1) Order or judgment quashing an arrest warrant.
(2) Order or judgment quashing a search warrant.
(3) Order or judgment suppressing evidence entered preliminary to trial.306
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides for appeals to the Supreme
Court "as a matter of right" in cases involving (a) revenue, (b) consti-
tutionality, (c) habeas corpus, and (d) capital cases, and in "all cases,"
other than those appealable to the Supreme Court, appeals may be
taken "as a matter of right" to the Appellate Court "except that after a
trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judg-
ment of acquittal. 30 , It is, therefore, clear that appeal is available as a
matter of right from final judgments in all cases, both civil and crimi-
nal, and to all parties, the State as well as the defendant, with the single
exception "that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal
shall lie from a judgment of acquittal." Thus, the right of the State of
Illinois to a review in criminal cases will be, under the Judicial Article
of 1961, broader than it is at present. For example, consider the case
of People v. Sortino, where a writ of error was sued out by the State
from the Supreme Court of Illinois under Docket No. 36044, and the
case of People v. Mosby, where a writ of error was sued out by the
State from the Supreme Court of Illinois under Docket No. 36052,
and both of which writs of error were, on November 17, 1960, on
motion of each of the defendants, dismissed by the Supreme Court
without opinion. In each of the above cases the Criminal Court of
Cook County had discharged the defendant because he had not been
brought to trial within four months from the date of commitment in
accordance with Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 748,
commonly known as the "four-term Act" and sometime referred to as
the "four-month Act." In view of the fact that the right of the State
to review is purely statutory, and since the statutory grounds for
305 Prior to the 1961 amendment, the State had no right to a review from an order
suppressing evidence in a criminal case. People v. Moore, 410 Ill. 241, 102 N.E.2d 146
(1951).
300 Judicial Article of 1961, § 5, 7.
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review are limited to decisions upon (1) motions to quash indict-
ment or information and (2) motions in arrest of judgment, the ac-
quital of Sortino and Mosby because of the expiration of the "four-
month" term without a trial on the merits did not fall within either of
the statutory grounds. On the other hand, since the State will, by vir-
tue of the Judicial Article of 1961, have a constitutional right of appeal
in all cases, except "that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no
appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal, ' '30 7 the acquittal of a
defendant because of the expiration of the "four-month" term, with-
out a trial on the merits, will entitle the State to an appeal.
What constitutes an acquittal after "a trial on the merits?" If evi-
dence as to the commission of the alleged crime is heard by the trial
court and a judgment of acquittal is entered, it is clearly an acquittal
after "a trial on the merits." What if the defendant files in the
trial court a special plea of "former conviction" or "immunity from
prosecution" and the trial court decides in favor of the defendant on
the plea and acquits him, will the State, under the Judicial Article of
1961, be entitled to prosecute an appeal? We believe not, because a de-
cision of the trial court in favor of the defendant on the special plea
is an acquittal after "a trial on the merits. 308
307 Id. S 7
308 People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553 (1961); People v. Nitti, 365 Ill.
20, 5 N.E.2d 476 (1936); People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 5 N.E.2d 474 (1936); People v.
White, 364 111. 574, 5 N.E.2d 472 (1936).
By statute, all defenses are available under the general issue, including any defense
that might be raised under a special plea in bar, but the statute does not abolish special
pleas and such pleas, including the pleas in bar, are appropriate and available in a crim-
inal case only in those instances where they were permitted at common law and are
restricted to their common law scope. People v. Furgeson, 20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 171
(1960).
In People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553 (1961), the Supreme Court of
Illinois said at page 351: "A 'trial' has been defined as a judicial examination, in accord-
ance with the law of the land, either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties,
whether of law or fact, before a court that has jurisdiction over it, (People v. Vitale,
364 I11. 589, 592,) and it has been also held that a hearing on the factual sufficiency of
a plea which, if sustained, will terminate the litigation, is a trial. (People v. White,
364 I11. 574; People v. Finkelstein, 372 Ill. 186.)"
Under the Judicial Article of 1961, no appeal will be available to either party from
an order granting probation. The defendant will not be able to take an appeal, be-
cause the voluntary acceptance of probation, suspended sentence or parole waives the
defendant's right to appeal. People v. Brown, 345 I11. App. 610, 104 N.E.2d 333 (1952);
People v. Collis, 344 II. App. 539, 101 N.E.2d 739 (1951). The State will not be able
to prosecute an appeal, because an order granting probation is not reviewable, as the
cause remains pending in the trial court. People v. Mayfield, 414 I11. 146, 111 N.E.2d
164 (1953); People v. Martin, 350 I11. App. 196, 112 N.E.2d 526 (1953).
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As to the review of interlocutory orders in criminal cases, which
was made available to the State of Illinois by the statutory amendment
of 1961, the matter will be under the control of the Supreme Court by
virtue of the following provision of the Judicial Article of 1961: "The
Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate
Court from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court. '309
35. Discretionary Review from Final Judgment of Circuit
Court Is Not Available
In the following situations, review of final judgments of trial courts
is a matter of discretion, not a matter of right:
(1) Writ of error under the Workmen's Compensation Act 310 and
Rule 60 of the Supreme Court.31
(2) Writ of error under the Workmen's Occupational Diseases
Act. 312
(3) Writ of error under the 'Post Conviction Hearing Act 13 and
Rule 27 of the Supreme Court.314
(4) Writ of error in criminal case under Rule 65-1 (2) of the Su-
preme Court. 15
The Judicial Article of 1961 makes a review of final judgments of
Circuit Courts in "all cases," civil and criminal, "a matter of right"
guaranteed by the Constitution. 31" This excludes the possibility of
making review subject to leave of court.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that in dealing with appeals from the
Appellate Court to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Article of 1961
provides for three situations, two of which are specified "as a matter
of right" and, as to the third, it provides that appeals from the Appel-
late Court to the Supreme Court "shall be by leave of the Supreme
Court. '5 17 No such "leave of court" provision exists as to review of
309 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7. 310 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19 (1961).
311 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.60 (1961). The Minimum Wage Act for women and
minors provides for review in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 198.13 (1961), and the Act for Workmen's Com-
pensation or Occupational Diseases Insurance for Rejected Employers provides for
review in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1091 (1961).
312 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.54 (1961).
313 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §5 826-32 (1961).
314 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 101.27 (1961).
3 1 5 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.65-I (2) (1961).
316 Judicial Article of 1961, §§ 5, 7. 317 Id. § 5.
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final judgments of the Circuit Courts, and it seems clear that such a
requirement, either by statute or rule of court, would be in conflict with
the provisions of the Judicial Article of 1961 for appeals in all cases(gas a matter of right. 81 8
36. Appeal Period
At present the Illinois statutes provide for a variety of appeal
periods. For example: Under the Civil Practice Act, the notice of ap-
peal must be filed within 60 days from the rendition of the final judg-
ment or decree.1 Under the Adoption Act, the notice of appeal must
be filed within 30 days from the final order or judgment.320 Under the
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, the notice of appeal must be filed
within 5 days from the rendition of the judgment.8 21
As to criminal cases, the period for review is much longer. Until
1961, there was no statute on the subject and the twenty-year common
law period for writ of error was followed. 22 In 1961, the period was
reduced by statute to three years with a proviso that after the three-
year period it may be prosecuted only by petition showing lack of
culpable negligence in the failure to act within the three years. 28 In
sharp contrast with the long Illinois period for review of criminal cases
is the Federal Rule which requires a defendant convicted in the Federal
court to file his notice of appeal within ten days after the rendition of
the decision by the United States District Court.
24
Since appeal in Illinois is purely statutory and the various legal sub-
jects are covered by a multitude of statutes, it is understandable how
this complicated situation developed.
318 Id. §§ 5, 7.
Under the Judicial Article of 1961, final judgments in post-conviction proceedings
will be appealable, as a matter of constitutional right, from the circuit courts directly
to the Supreme Cour, because (a) they involve constitutional questions and (b) they
are in essence "habeas corpus" proceedings. Judicial Article of 1961, § 5. See Young v.
Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948); Marino
v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
319 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 76 (1961).
320 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20 (1961).
321 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, §§ 19-22 (1961). For a collection of statutes and cases dealing
with the great variety of statutory periods for appeal, see FINS, APPEALS AND WRITS OF
ERROR IN ILLINOIS 15-22 (11th ed.-1962).
322 People v. Munroe, 15 Il.2d 91, 154 N.E.2d 225 (1958); People v. Hartfield, 11
ll.2d 300, 142 N.E.2d 696 (1957); People v. Williams, 4 Il. App.2d 506, 124 N.E.2d 537
(1955); People v. Binkowski, 394 Ill. 171, 68 N.E.2d 304 (1946); People v. Shaffer, 393
Ill. 445, 66 N.E.2d 419 (1946); People v. Chapman, 392 Ill. 168, 64 N.E.2d 529 (1946);
People v. Murphy, 296 Il. 532, 129 N.E. 868 (1921).
323 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1961). 324 FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a).
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The Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[tihe Supreme Court
shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. ' 3 25 The
Supreme Court will, therefore, have to provide an appeal period for all
cases. Since appeals in the State of Illinois in all cases, civil and crimi-
nal, will be, after January 1, 1964, a matter of constitutional right
emanating from the very same constitutional provisions, 26 the period
for appeal-whether the Supreme Court chooses 30, 60 or 90 days or
any other period-should be as uniform as possible. 7
In the following situations the reviewing court may, by virtue of
statute, allow a litigant to proceed with review although the normal
time for review has expired:
(1) Appeal in civil cases after the expiration of 60 days and within
one year from the rendition of the final order, judgment or decree,
under Section 76 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.3 28
(2) Appeal under local improvement provisions of the Illinois
Municipal Code after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the
final order or judgment.3 29
(3) Writ of error or appeal in criminal cases after three years from
the date of the final judgment.330
Since the Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[t]he Supreme
Court shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals,"33 '
it will be necessary to repeal these statutory provisions and to replace
325 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7. 320 Id. §§ 5, 7.
327 Unequal opportunities accorded by a State in connection with the right of re-
view may raise serious constitutional questions under the "due process of law" and
"equal protection of laws" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States are violated where a state statute providing for writs
of error in all criminal cases as a matter of right is so administered as to deny full
appellate review in a non-capital felony case to an indigent defendant solely because
of his inability to pay for a transcript of the record, while granting such review to all
other defendants. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); People v. Griffin, 9 Ill.2d 164,
137 N.E.2d 485 (1956). A statute deprives a defendant of a constitutional right guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment if it denies him appellate review of a conviction
merely because he cannot afford to pay for the record of his trial. Eskridge v. Wash-
ington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958). A state may not, consistently with the Federal
Constitution, require an indigent defendant in a criminal case to pay a filing fee before
permitting him to file a motion for leave to appeal in one of its courts. Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959).
328 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 76 (1961).
329 ILL. Rrv..STAT. ch. 24, 9-2-141 (1961).
330 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1961). 331 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7.
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them with rules of the Supreme Court if the Court desires to make
provisions therefor.
37. Appeal Bond
Under the present Illinois law, no appeal bond is required for the
purpose of prosecuting an appeal from a final judgment or decree of a
trial court to the Appellate or Supreme Courts, except in the follow-
ing situations:
(1) An appeal from a final judgment in an action under the Forc-
ible Entry and Detainer Act requires the filing of an appeal bond.332
(2) An appeal from an order of the County Court refusing an
application for registration as a voter requires the posting of an appeal
bond in the sum of $200.00.333
(3) If the appellant is not a resident of Illinois or is insolvent, the
court may dismiss the appeal for failure to file a cost bond, in accord-
ance with Rule 52 of the Supreme Court of Illinois.334
Since, under the present law, appeals from trial courts do not in-
volve any constitutional rights, the General Assembly and the Su-
preme Court may place thereon such restrictions as they deem advis-
able. On the other hand, under the Judicial Article of 1961, appeals
from "final judgments" of circuit courts are in all cases "a matter of
right" guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, it is very doubtful
whether the General Assembly or the Supreme Court may place any
restrictions or limitations by requiring a bond and thereby hinder the
litigant or burden him in the exercise of an absolute constitutional right.
Moreover, to require an appeal bond in some cases and not in
others creates unequal treatment by the State in connection with the
right of review and raises serious constitutional questions under the
"due process of law" and "equal protection of laws" clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.135
The foregoing discussion has no bearing on the requirement of a
supersedeas bond, as a supersedeas merely suspends the enforcement of
the judgment and does not affect the right of appeal. 336
332 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, §§ 19-22 (1961).
333 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 6-47, 6-52 (1961).
334 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.52 (1961).
335 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); and Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), discussed in footnote 327
supra.
336 In Gumberts v. East Oak St. Hotel Co., 404 I11. 386, 88 N.E.2d 883 (1949), the
Supreme Court said: "The operation and effect of supersedeas is generally well under-
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38. Writ of Error Abolished
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides for two
methods of review: (1) appeal and (2) writ of error.33 7 The Illinois
Civil Practice Act, which has been in effect since January 1, 1934,
abandoned the writ of error as a mode of review and confined review
to appeal only.3 38 A large number of other statutes have followed the
same course.339 The Criminal Code, as amended in 1959, effective
January 1, 1960, provides that a party in a criminal case entitled to a
writ of error may proceed by appeal instead of writ of error.340 The
Judicial Article of 1961 has eliminated the writ of error as a mode of
review and specifically provides for review in all cases exclusively by
appeal.3 41
To bring the Rules of the Supreme Court in harmony with the
Judicial Article of 1961, Rules 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 66, dealing with
writs of error, will have to be abrogated.
39. Review of Administrative Action to be Governed by Statute
The Judicial Article of 1961 contains two provisions regarding
review of administrative action:
(1) "The Circuit Court shall have .. .such powers of review of
administrative action as may be provided by law. '342
(2) "The Appellate Court shall have such powers of direct review
of administrative action as may be provided by law." 3 3
Should the Legislature repeal the present statutes providing for ad-
ministrative review and fail to make provision for review of administra-
tive action, the circuit courts, which will have "unlimited original juris-
diction of all justiciable matters, ' 344 would have authority to review
administrative decisions by common law certiorari. 345
stood. Its object and purpose are to suspend the efficacy of a judgment or decree. The
supersedeas operates against the enforcement of the judgment and not against the
judgment itself. Its purpose is accomplished by staying all future proceedings on the
judgment." Id. at 389,88 N.E.2d at 885.
337 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §S 8, 11, 19. 338 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 5 74 (1961).
3 39 For example, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 26; ch. 45, § 50; ch. 112, § 15 (1961). See
also FINs, Illinois Should Substitute Appeal for Writ of Error in All Cases, 45 ILL. B.J.
230 (1956).
340 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769.1 (1961). 342 Id. 5 9.
341 Judicial Article of 1961, §§ 5, 7. 343 Id. § 7.
344 Id. S 9.
345 "The common law writ of certiorari is available to review administrative proceed-
ings in cases wherein powers are conferred upon administrative tribunals and no pro-
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Within the last fifty years, several attempts have been made to have
the Supreme Court of Illinois review administrative decisions directly,
without the necessity of taking the case through a trial court, but the
Supreme Court of Illinois has consistently held that, under the Judicial
Article of the Constitution of 1870, it could not do so."'
Under the Judicial Article of 1961, the Illinois court system will
consist of three tiers-Circuit Court, Appellate Court and Supreme
Court-and will structurally closely resemble the Federal court system
which consists of three tiers-District Court, Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court-and where the trial tribunal (District Court) is inte-
grated, having jurisdiction over all justiciable matters-law, equity,
admiralty, bankruptcy, civil and criminal. In the Federal system, deci-
sions of some federal administrative agencies do not go to the United
States District Court at all and are reviewed or enforced by the United
States Court of Appeals. 47 Some of the federal administrative agencies
whose decisions are so reviewed or enforced by the United States
Court of Appeals are: National Labor Relations Board,348 Federal
Trade Commission, 49 Securities and Exchange Commission,35 ° Civil
Aeronautics Board,3 5' and Federal Power Commission.5 2
The Illinois General Assembly will have to determine, as a matter
of policy, whether the action of any, or some, or all of the State
administrative agencies shall be reviewed by the circuit courts, as is
the present practice, or directly by the Appellate Court. The Admin-
istrative Review Act13 will have to be reconsidered and Sections 13
and 14 thereof3 54 substantially amended.
vision is made by the statute for a review of such proceedings." FINS, ILLINOIS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ch. 2 (1942).
346 Certification by the State Tax Commission, Eli Bates House v. Board of Appeals,
358 Ill. 596, 193 N.E. 526 (1934); appeal to set aside decision of Board of Appeals of
Cook County, North Chicago Hebrew Congregation v. Board of Appeals, 358 Il. 549,
193 N.E. 519 (1934); certiorari to review decision of Industrial Board of Illinois, Courter
v. Simpson Construction, 264 111. 488, 106 N.E. 350 (1914).
,347 See FINS, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 176-7 (1960).
348 29 U.S.C. S 160 (1958). 349 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
350 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i, 77vvv, 78y, 79x, 80a-42, 80 b-13 (1958).
325r 149 U.S.C. § 1486 (1958). 352 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1958).
353 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-79 (1961).
354 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 276-77 (1961).
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40. Interlocutory Appeals
Appeals from interlocutory orders are at present available in Illi-
nois by virtue of the following three statutory provisions:
(a) Section 78 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act35 5 as amended in
1961:
1. Granting an injunction.
2. Modifying an injunction.
3. Refusing an injunction.
4. Dissolving an injunction.
5. Refusing to dissolve an injunction.
6. Refusing to modify an injunction.
7. Appointing a receiver.
8. Refusing to appoint a receiver.
9. Giving other or further powers or property to a receiver already appointed.
10. Refusing to give other or further powers or property to a receiver already
appointed.
11. Placing a mortgagee in possession of mortgaged premises.
12. Refusing to place a mortgagee in possession of mortgaged premises.
(b) Section 77 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, providing for an
appeal from an order granting a new trial.3 56
355 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, S 78 (1961). In Illinois no appeal from an interlocutory
order was possible prior to 1887. Murray v. Hagmann, 315 Ill. 437, 146 N.E. 472 (1925);
J. H. Walters & Co. v. Canham Sheet Metal Corp., 8 Ill. App. 2d 121, 130 N.E. 2d 675
(1955). On July 1, 1887, there came into effect "An Act to provide for appeals from
interlocutory orders granting injunction or appointing receivers." The provisions of
that Act were substantially re-enacted as Section 123 of the Practice Act of 1907, and
the same provisions were substantially (but with some modification in procedure) re-
enacted as Section 78 of the Civil Practice Act of 1933, which section was supplemented
by Rule 31 of the Supreme Court of Illinois. The constitutionality of said Section 78
and Rule 31 was sustained in Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25, 1 N.E.2d 220 (1936).
Prior to January 1, 1956, the following orders were not appealable: An order denying
an application for the appointment of a receiver. Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Inv. Co.,
309 Ill. 103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923); Eichenbaum v. State & Quincy Bldg. Corp., 295 Ill. App.
617 (1938). An order allowing a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. American
Dixie Shops, Inc. v. Springfield Lords, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 2d 129, 130 N.E.2d 532 (1955);
Liberty Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 342 Il. App. 328,96 N.E. 2d 663 (1950); Stephens
v. Stephan, 216 Ill. App. 107 (1919); Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield,
206 Ill. App.(575 (1917). An order denying a motion for a temporary injunction. Spring-
field Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield, 206 Ill. App. 575 (1917); Builders' Painting &
Decorating Co. v. Advisory Bd. Bldg. Trades, 116 111. App. 264 (1904). These interlo-
cutory orders were made appealable by the amendment to Section 78 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act which became effective January 1, 1956. In 1961, interlocutory orders placing
or refusing to place a mortgagee in possession of mortgaged premises were made appeal-
able.
356 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 77 (1961). An appeal from an order granting a new trial
was unknown in Illinois prior to the passage of the Civil Practice Act. Kavanaugh v.
Washburn, 387 Ill. 204, 56 N.E.2d 420 (1944). The constitutionality of this innovation
has been sustained in the following cases: Goodrich v. Sprague, 385 11. 200, 52 N.E.2d
250 (1944); Baumgarder v. Boyer, 384 111. 584, 52 N.E.2d 247 (1944); Scott v. Freeport
Motor Cas. Co., 379 111. 155, 39 N.E.2d 999 (1942).
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(c) Section 17 of Division 13 of the Criminal Code357 as amended
in 1961:
1. Order or judgment quashing an arrest warrant.
2. Order or judgment quashing a search warrant.
3. Order or judgment suppressing evidence entered preliminary to trial.
To bring the Illinois statutes in harmony with the Judicial Article
of 1961, all of the above statutory provisions dealing with interlocu-
tory appeals will have to be repealed and the Supreme Court will have
the choice of promulgating, in lieu thereof, such rules as it deems ad-
visable, as the Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "[t]he Supreme
Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from
other than final judgments of the Circuit Court. '358
Under Section 78 of the Civil Practice Act, interlocutory appeals
involving injunctions, receivership or mortgage foreclosures may be
taken only to the Appellate Court and not to the Supreme Court, even
though the issues involve a constitutional question, revenue, or a free-
hold. 59 On the other hand, under Section 77 of the Civil Practice Act,
an appeal from an order granting a new trial is appealable to the
Appellate Court or to the Supreme Court as in appeals from final
orders in other cases °.3 0 Likewise, in criminal proceedings, review
from interlocutory orders (which was made possible by statutory
amendment of 1961) will, no doubt, frequently involve State and Fed-
eral constitutional questions of search and seizure and will be review-
able directly by the Supreme Court.303 However, under the Judicial
357 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 747 (1961). 358 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7.
350 Seagram Distillers Co. v. Armanetti, 19 11. App. 2d 575, 154 N.E.2d 866 (1958);
People v. Kostaken, 10 Ill.2d 549, 141 N.E.2d 44 (1957); Webb v. Marozas, 268 Ill. App.
338 (1932); Bistor v. McDonough, 262 I1. App. 404 (1931); Klever Shampay Karpet
Kleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 291 (1925); Murray v. Hagmann, 315 Ill.
437, 146 N.E.2d 472 (1925); People v. Sears, 230 IIl. App. 484 (1923); Mobile & 0. R.R.
v. Fraser, 169 Il. App. 210 (1912); New Ohio Washed Coal Co. v. Coal Belt Ry., 116
Ill. App. 153 (1904).
360 In Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 23 I1l.2d 74, 177 N.E.2d 178 (1961), an appeal
from an order in a condemnation case granting a new trial was taken to the Supreme
Court, which Court entertained jurisdiction and said: "This is an appeal, upon leave
granted by this court, from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting a new
trial in an eminent domain proceeding. Our jurisdiction is based upon Section 12 of the
Eminent Domain Act. (I11. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 47, par. 12) and section 77(2) of
the Civil Practice Act. I11. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 110, par. 77." Id. at 75-6, 177 N.E.2d at
178.
361 Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); People v. Jackson, 22 Ill.2d 382, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961); People v. Burnett, 20
I1l.2d 624, 170 N.E.2d 546 (1960); People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill.2d 232, 170 N.E.2d 151
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Article of 1961, all interlocutory appeals will have to be taken to the
Appellate Court and none directly to the Supreme Court.3 62
41. Masters in Chancery, Referees and Special Cornnissioners
in Trial Courts Abolisbed
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 does not mention
Masters in Chancery. These officers have come into being in Illinois as
a part of general chancery practice. Their appointment and fees to be
paid to them for their services are governed by statute. 63 The Judicial
Article of 1961 provides: "There shall be no masters in chancery or
other fee officers in the judicial system. '364 That "referees" are in-
cluded in the abolition of masters in chancery is made clear in Para-
graph 8 of the Schedule to the Judicial Article of 1961, wherein it is
stated that "[m]asters in chancery and referees in office in any court on
the Effective Date of this Article [January 1, 1964] shall be continued
as masters in chancery or referees, respectively, until the expiration of
their terms, and may thereafter by order of court, wherever justice
requires, conclude matters in which testimony has been received."
This constitutional prohibition against masters in chancery and fee
officers will, no doubt, apply as well to special commissioners, as "[t]he
terms special commissioners and master in chancery have long been
used interchangeably. ' 365
In order to bring the Illinois statutes in harmony with the Judicial
Article of 1961, it will be necessary for the General Assembly to give
attention to the statutes involved. 66 It will also be necessary to repeal
Section 61 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, which section provides
(1960); People v. Mayo, 19 ll.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960); People v. Watkins, 19 111.
2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); People v. Berry, 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959);
People v. West, 15 I1l.2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286 (1958); People v. Clark, 9 lll.2d 400, 137
N.E.2d 820 (1956); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
362 Judicial Article of 1961, § 7.
363 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 90, §§ 1-13; ch. 53, §§ 38, 38b; ch. 37, § 341; ch. 37, § 415 (1961).
364 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8.
365 Price v. Seator, 337 Ill. App. 248, 254, 85 N.E.2d 848, 851 (1949), citing Harding v.
Hundy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 46 (1826); Davis v. Davis, 30111. 180 (1863); White v. Haf-
faker, 27 Ill. 349 (1862); and Farnsworth v. Strasler, 12 Ill. 482 (1851). See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, § 16; ch. 68, § 22 (1961).
366 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 90, §§ 1-56; ch. 117, §§ 1-10 (1961), will have to be repealed,
and many statutes which make provision for functions to be performed by Masters in
Chancery, Commissioners or Referees will require revision.
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for references to masters or referees, 67 and to abrogate Rule 14-1 of
the Supreme Court of Illinois.368
42. Justices of the Peace and Police Magistrates Abolished
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides for jus-
tices of the peace and police magistrates.3 6 ' The Judicial Article of
1961 provides that on January 1, 1964, the offices of justice of the
peace and police magistrate are abolished. 7 ' However, the incumbents
are to serve as "magistrates" of the circuit court until the end of their
respective terms.3 '
43. Merger of Law and Equity Jurisdiction
The merger of law and equity developed in Illinois gradually:
(1) The Illinois Civil Practice Act, which was enacted in 1933,
effective January 1, 1934, merged law and equity as to venue, process,
parties, pleading and appellate practice. 2
(2) In Homer v. Jamieson, decided in 1946, the Supreme Court
said: 37
Plaintiff contends that there is no provision in law for the filing of an equi-
table counterclaim in an action of ejectment. Prior to 1935, section 19 of the
Ejectment Act (Cahill's Stat. 1933, chap. 45, par. 19), provided that the defend-
ant to an ejectment action could demur to the declaration as in personal actions
or plead the general issue, under which defendant might introduce in evidence
any matter that would tend to defeat the plaintiff's action except as otherwise
provided by the Ejectment Act. Under this provision it was held that estoppel
in pais was not available as a defense to an action of ejectment. (Metzger v.
Horn, 312 Ill. 173; Wakefield v. VanTassell, 202 Ill. 41; Wright v. Stice, 173
Il. 571; Winslow v. Cooper, 104 1l. 235.) Section 10 of the Ejectment Act as
amended in 1935 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, chap. 45, sec. 10) provides that rules of
pleading and practice in other civil cases shall apply to actions of ejectment so
far as they are applicable and except as is otherwise provided by this act.
Section 19 of the act was amended permitting a defendant to file a motion as
in ordinary civil cases and to answer by way of general or specific denial or
by affirmative defense. These provisions permit a defendant to plead equitable
defenses to an ejectment action to the same extent that he might plead such
defenses to other civil actions under the Civil Practice Act. Firke v. McClure,
389 Ill. 543.
367 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 61 (1961).
368 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.14-1 (1961). 369 ILL. CONST. art VI, § 1.
370 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 5 (a).
371 Id. para. 4(e). See subtopic 6-Judicial Officers of Circuit Court.
372 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-94 (1961).
373 394 I1. 222, 223-4, 68 N.E.2d 287, 288 (1946).
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(3) In Ellman v. DeRuiter, decided in 1952, where plaintiff sought
to set aside a judgment at law after the expiration of thirty days, the
Supreme Court said: 874
While our present Civil Practice Act has not effected a complete amalgama-
tion of the practice and procedure in common-law and suits in equity in this
jurisdiction, it is our opinion that there has been a fusion sufficient to enable a
court of law, when the occasion demands it, to apply equitable principles in
administering the summary relief available under the motion which has been
substituted for writ of error coram nobis. Stated differently, it is our belief
that the motion may, under our present practice, be addressed to the equitable
powers of the court, when the exercise of such power is necessary to prevent
injustice.
(4) Following the Ellman case, the Illinois Civil Practice Act was
revised in 1955, effective January 1, 1956, and established a uniform
practice at law and in equity for the setting aside of judgments and
decrees after the expiration of thirty days, as follows:375
Relief from final orders, judgments and decrees, after 30 days from the entry
thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this section. Writs of error
coram nobis and coram vobis, writs of audita querela, bills of review and bills
in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable
and the grounds for said relief heretofore available, either at law or in equity,
whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in
every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order,
judgment or decree from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which
it was entered. There shall be no distinction among actions at law, suits in
equity and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to availability of re-
lief, grounds for relief or the relief obtainable.
(5) The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that
"[t]he circuit court shall have original jurisdiction of all cases in law
and equity. 3 70 In sharp contrast, the Judicial Article of 1961 provides
that "[t]he Circuit Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters."3' 77 Therefore, the jurisdictional distinction be-
tween law and equity will no longer exist, and the maintaining of
separate law and equity dockets will no longer be necessary.
(6) At the present time, judges in the circuit courts of the State and
judges in the Superior Court of Cook County sit in a double capacity
-as judges at law and as chancellors in equity. Only equity cases may
374 412 111. 285, 292, 106 N.E.2d 350, 353-4 (1952).
375 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1) (1961). As to writ of error coram nobis and bill of
review, see FINS, Unnecessary Successive Suits in Illinois Practice, 6 JOHN MARSHALL
L.Q. 469 (1941).
376 ILL. CONST. art VI, S 12. 377 judicial Article of 1961, S 9.
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be referred to a master in chancery,37 and the abolition of masters in
chancery3 79 is another step in the direction of merger of law and
equity jurisdiction, as all non-jury cases will be tried alike.
(7) The merger of law and equity jurisdiction will have no effect
on the present right of trial by jury, as Section 5 of Article II of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870 provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury
as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate."
To bring the Illinois statutes in harmony with the Judicial Article
of 1961, it will be necessary to amend Sections 1, 44(2) and 64 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act 380 and to abrogate Rules 9, 10 and 11 of the
Supreme Court of Illinois,3 81 which acknowledge a distinction be-
tween law and equity jurisdiction and make provision therefor.
44. Broader Scope of Probate Practice
In Howard v. Swift, 81a the Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the
law pertaining to the jurisdiction of probate courts and said:lslb
The jurisdiction of the probate court is defined and restricted by section 20
of article 6 of the State constitution. So far as applicable to this case, section 20
provides: 'Said courts, when established, shall have original jurisdiction of all
probate matters, the settlement of estates of deceased persons,' etc. The probate
court, by virtue of the constitution, is therefore not a court of general jurisdic-
tion, but its jurisdiction is circumscribed and restrained by the constitution. Any
legislative acts which attempt to extend such jurisdiction beyond that conferred
by the constitution are violative of the constitution. Such court has no general
equitable jurisdiction but can only exercise equitable power within the zone con-
ferred by the constitution. (Hannah v. Meinshausen, 299 Ill. 525; People v.
Seelye, 146 id. 189; Davis, Cory & Co. v. Chicago Dock Co. 129 id. 180; People
v. Loomis, 96 id. 377.) The probate court has no jurisdiction over trust estates.
(Dingman v. Beall, 213 Ill. 238.) The law which purported to confer upon pro-
bate courts jurisdiction to supervise and control testamentary trusts created by
wills proved and probated in probate courts was held by this court as not re-
lating to a 'probate matter,' as defined by section 20, and it was held unconsti-
tutional. (In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520; Frackelton v. Masters, 249
id. 30.) A contingent claim which has not developed into an absolute liability
cannot be proved and allowed in the probate court against an estate. Foreman
Trust and Savings Bank v. Tauber, 348 Ill. 280; Chicago Title and Trust Co.
v. Fine Arts Building, 288 id. 142; Pearson v. McBean, 231 id. 536.
The liability sought to be imposed upon the decedent's estate is founded
upon the alleged fraudulent and unlawful acts of the deceased while in his life-
378 Flake v. Pretzel, 381 111. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943).
379 Judicial Article of 1961, § 8.
380 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1, 44(2), 64(1961).
381 ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 101.9, 101.10, 101.11 (1961).
381a 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934). 381b Id. at 84-5, 190 N.E. 104-5.
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time acting as an officer and director of the Securities Co pany. We can not
agree with the contention of the claimant that the cause of action stated is a
money claim, equitable in its nature. The cause of action stated is clearly one
of tort.
The claimant also contends that the language employed in sections 60 and 70
of the Administration act clearly comprehends the exhibiting in the probate
court of all types of legal liabilities of the decedent, both ex contractu and ex
delicto. In view of what we have heretofore said, if we are to give such sections
the meaning urged by the claimant, such sections, in so far as they attempt to
confer upon the probate court jurisdiction to hear and determine actions ex
delicto, would be violative of section 20.
The claimant was not without remedy even though his case was in tort. The
circuit court, by section 12 of article 6 of our constitution, has original juris-
diction of all causes in law and equity. Under this constitutional provision the
circuit court has jurisdiction of actions against administrators and executors to
enforce the legal liabilities of the decedent regardless of the character or form
of the action, and such jurisdiction is not impaired either by section 20 or the
statute conferring original jurisdiction on the probate court 'of all probate mat-
ters' and 'the settlement of estates of deceased persons.' Darling v. McDonald,
101 111. 370; Roberts v. Flatt, 142 id. 485; Morse v. Pacific Railway Co., 191 id.
356; Starrett v. Brosseau, 208 id. 408.
In view of the fact that under the Judicial Article of 1961, all probate
matters will be handled by the circuit courts which will have "unlimited
original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters," the scope of probate
practice will include claims ex contractu, ex delicto, legal, equitable
and trust matters without limitation.
45. Final Order Is "Judgment" Not "Decree"
Historically, the last order in an action at law was denominated a
"judgment" and the last order in a suit in equity was denominated a
"decree." In the Illinois Civil Practice Act, which deals with actions
at law and in equity, the designation "judgment" alone is employed in
some sections of the Act,3 2 and the designation of "judgment" and
"decree" is used simultaneously in other sections of the Act.8s3 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have adopted the designation of
"judgment" for all cases-in equity as well as at law-and have com-
pletely abandoned the designation of "decree. 38 4 The Judicial Article
of 1961 provides for appeals from the "final judgments of the circuit
382 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 5, 13.4, 16, 20, 22,23,27.1,29,44,46,53,56,71 (1961).
383 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8,10,14,50,57,57.1,64,68.3,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,82,87,88,89,92
(1961).
384 FED. R. Civ. P. 54,55,56,57,58,59,60,62,68,70.
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courts''385 and for appeals in all cases, other than those appealable di-
rectly to the Supreme Court, to the Appellate Court from "final judg-
ments" of a circuit court.386 It is, therefore, clear that the designation
of "decree" is not intended to be used after January 1, 1964, when the
Judicial Article becomes effective. That this uniform nomenclature
was deliberately chosen is evident by the fact that, in dealing with the
enforcement of orders entered by Illinois courts prior to January 1,
1964, paragraph 5 (c) of the Schedule of the Judicial Article of 1961
refers to "judgments and decrees" theretofore entered by the prede-
cessor courts, as follows:
Each court into which jurisdiction of other courts is transferred shall succeed
to and assume jurisdiction of all causes, matters and proceedings then pending,
with full power and authority to dispose of them and to carry into execution
or otherwise to give effect to all orders, judgments and decrees theretofore
entered by the predecessor courts.
Furthermore, the fact that the uniform terminology of "final judg-
ment," as used in the Judicial Article of 1961 pertaining to appeals in
all cases, was deliberately chosen is apparent when compared with
Sections 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 87, 88, 89 and 92 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act,387 all of which sections also deal with the subject of
appeal and in all of which sections "judgment" and "decree" are em-
ployed simultaneously.
46. Rule Making Power of Supreme Court
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 does not mention
anything pertaining to rule-making powers of the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court has decided that rule-making is part of
its inherent powers and that it needs no express authorization in order
to make rules pertaining to practice and procedure in the courts of the
State.388 Accordingly, there are now in effect a number of rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Illinois regulating practice and
procedure in the Illinois trial and reviewing courts. Since rule-making
power is inherent in the Supreme Court, no express authorization is
necessary, and the Court may, under the Judicial Article of 1961, con-
385 Judicial Article of 1961, S 5. 386 1d. § 7.
387 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1961).
388 Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 367 111. 489, 11 N.E.2d 963 (1937); Winning v. Winning,
366 I11. 57, 7 N.E.2d 750 (1937); Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 I11. 25, 1 N.E.2d 220
(1936); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 361 I11. 499, 198 N.E. 432 (1935); People v. Cowdrey, 360
111. 633, 196 N.E. 838 (1935); People v. Callopy, 358 111. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
ILLINOIS JUDICIAL ARTICLE Za+/
tinue to promulgate rules of practice and procedure under its inherent
authority, as it has been doing for many years.
47. Licensing of Attorneys
The Judicial Aritcle of 1870 does not mention anything pertaining
to the licensing of attorneys at law by the Supreme Court. However,
the Supreme Court has decided that the licensing of attorneys is part
of its inherent power and that it needs no express authorization there-
for.389 The Judicial Article of 1961, like its predecessor, does not men-
tion anything pertaining to the licensing of attorneys at law, but, since
this power is inherent in the Supreme Court, no express authorization
is necessary, and the Court may continue to exercise its authority in
the licensing of attorneys at law as it has been doing heretofore.
48. Supreme Court Commissioners
As to censure, suspension and disbarment of atorneys at law in this
State, the Supreme Court of Illinois operates through appointed com-
missioners,9 ° who hear evidence and report their findings and recom-
mendations to the Supreme Court for decision.3 1 The Supreme Court
also has original jurisdiction to hold laymen in contempt for the un-
authorized practice of law,3 92 and when a question of fact arises in
such proceeding, the Supreme Court refers the matter to a commis-
sioner for the hearing of evidence and the commissioner then reports
his findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court for decision.39 3
389 In re Anastaplo, 18 l1.2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1960); In re Latimer, 11 l1.2d 327,
143 N.E.2d 20 (1957); In re Anastaplo, 3 Il1.2d 471, 121N.E.2d 826 (1954); In re Frank,
293 111. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920); In re Day, 181 111. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
390 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 59.
391 For example, see In re Browning, 23 1Il.2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14 (1962); In re Crane,
23 I1.2d 398, 178 N.E.2d 349 (1961); In re Ahern, 23 Ill.2d 69, 177 N.E.2d 197 (1961);
In re Fuma, 22 I1l.2d 429, 176 N.E.2d 779 (1961); In re Bodkin, 21 111.2d 458, 173 N.E.2d
440 (1961); In re Hansen, 21 I11.2d 326, 172 N.E.2d 772 (1961); In re Eaton, 14 I1l.2d 338,
152 N.E. 2d 850 (1958); In re McCallum, 391 111. 400,64 N.E.2d 310 (1945).
392 People v. Barasch, 21 Ill.2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961); People v. Schafer, 404 Ill.
45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949); People v. Tinkoff, 399 111. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693 (1948); People v.
Novotny, 386 Ill. 536, 54 N.E. 2d 536 (1944); People v. Goodman, 366 Il. 346, 8 N.E.2d
941 (1937); People v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 111. 50, 199 N.E.1 (1935); People v.
Motorists' Ass'n, 354 I1. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1933); People v. Association of Real Estate
Tax-Payers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 111. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931). See In re Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 13 lll.2d 391, 150
N.Ii.2d 163 (1958).
393 For example, see People v. Barasch, 21 ll.2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961), where
the Honorable Roger J. Kiley, Justice of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First
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Section 8 of the Judicial Article of 1961 provides that "there shall
be no masters in chancery or other fee officers in the judicial system."
Since the terms "special commissioner" and "masters in chancery" have
been used interchangeably,3 94 the argument has been advanced that,
under the Judicial Article of 1961, the Supreme Court of Illinois will
not be able to employ these commissioners in connection with disci-
plinary action involving the practice of law. This contention finds no
support in the history of the Judicial Article of 1961. The insistence
upon abolition of masters in chancery in the trial courts was the result
of the undesirable "fee system" whereby litigants were, in many cases,
compelled to pay large sums to Masters in Chancery. On the other
hand, commissioners appointed by the Supreme Court in disciplinary
proceedings have always devoted their time and energies gratuitously,
as a public service, without any compensation whatsoever. The prohi-
bition in the Judicial Article of 1961 against "masters in chancery"
was not intended for or directed against commissioners of the Supreme
Court and should have no application to them.
49. Clerks of Court
At present, the selection of clerks of the various courts, their re-
spective terms and their compensation is governed by provisions con-
tained in two different Articles of the Illinois Constitution of 1870
(Article VI, entitled "Judicial Department" and Article X, entitled
"Counties") and in a number of Acts spread in various chapters of the
Illinois Statute book. Thus, the Clerk of the Supreme Court is elected
for a term of six years.395 His salary is fixed by statute and paid by the
State. 9 ' Clerks of the Appellate Courts are elected for a term of six
years. 97 They receive no salaries and, as compensation, retain the
statutory fees which are paid to them by litigants. However, begin-
ning with November, 1962, Clerks of the Appellate Courts will (by
virtue of a statutory amendment which was approved on May 16,
1961) become salaried officers paid by the State and the fees and costs
District, acted as special commissioner for the Supreme Court of Illinois. See also In re
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Il.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958), where the Honorable
Charles H. Thompson, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois, acted as special
commissioner for the Supreme Court of Illinois.
394 Price v. Seator, 337 I11. App. 248, 85 N.E.2d 848 (1949), and cases therein cited.
195 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 10; 111. Rev. Star. ch. 46, § 28 (1961).
397 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 27 (1961).396 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 29 (1961).
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which the Clerks will receive will be paid into the State Treasury. 98
Clerks of the circuit courts are elected for a term of four years. 99
Their salaries (in counties other than Cook) are fixed by the county
boards and paid by the respective counties. 00 Clerks of the county
courts are elected for a term of four years401 and their salaries (in
counties other than Cook) are fixed by the county boards and paid by
the respective counties.0 2 Clerks of the probate courts are elected for
a term of four years40 3 and their salaries (in counties other than Cook)
are fixed by the county boards and paid by the respective counties.40 4
Clerks of city, village and town courts are elected for a term of six
years and their salaries are fixed and paid by the respective municipali-
ties in which the courts are situated.40 5 The Clerk of the Municipal
Court of Chicago is elected for a term of six years. His salary is fixed
by the City of Chicago. The salary may be increased by the City
Council of the City of Chicago.40 6 Clerks of municipal courts are
elected for a term of four years. Their salaries are fixed by statute and
paid by the municipality wherein the court is located. The salary may
be increased by the city council of the municipality. 407
The Clerk of the Superior Court of Cook County is elected for a
term of four years.40 ' The Clerk of the Criminal Court of Cook
County is elected for a term of four years.40 9
As to the courts of Cook County, the salaries of the respective
Clerks of the Circuit Court, Superior Court, Criminal Court, County
Court and Probate Court are fixed by statute and paid by the County
of Cook.410
As to the clerks of courts of record of Cook County, Section 9 of
Article X of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 provides:
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 27,49 (1961). 399 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 8.
400 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 37a (1961). It should be noted that Section 10 of Article X
of the Illinois Constitution provides that "said compensation shall be paid only out of,
and shall in no instance exceed, the fees actually collected."
401 ILL. CONST. art. VI, S 18.
402 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 2; ch. 53, § 37a (1961).
403 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 310 (1961).
404 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 319; ch. 53, § 37a (1961).
40 5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 339 (1961). 408 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 27.
406 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 369 (1961). 409 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-17 (1961).
407 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 453-4 (1961). 410 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 49 (1961).
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The clerks of all the courts of record, the treasurer, sheriff, coroner and
recorder of deeds of Cook county, shall receive, as their only compensation for
their services, salaries to be fixed by law, which shall in no case be as much
as the lawful compensation of a judge of the circuit court of said county, and
shall be paid, respectively, only out of the fees of the office actually collected.
All fees, perquisites and emoluments (above the amount of said salaries) shall
be paid into the county treasury. The number of the deputies and assistants of
such officers shall be determined by rule of the circuit court, to be entered of
record, and their compensation shall be determined by the county board.
Section 20 of the Judicial Article of 1961 provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the selection by the judges
or election, terms of office, removal for cause and salaries of clerks and other
non-judicial officers of the various courts; provided that a clerk shall be se-
lected or elected for each Appellate Court District.
50. State's Attorneys
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides for a
State's Attorney to be elected in each county every four years.41 ' The
Judicial Article of 1961 provides likewise and further specifies that
the State's Attorney shall be a "licensed attorney-at-law of this
State. 11 2 This express requirement, however, is merely declaratory of
the case law on the subject, as the Supreme Court of Illinois has de-
cided that a State's Attorney must be a licensed attorney-at-law of this
State.41 3
51. Formalism in Writs and in Indictments and
lnformations Not Required
The Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1870 provides that:
All process shall run: In the name of the People of the State of Illinois; and
all prosecutions shall be carried on: In the name and by the authority of the
People of the State of Illinois; and conclude: Against the peace and dignity of
the same.414
As a result of these requirements, many writs, indictments and infor-
mations have been held invalid.41 The Judicial Article of 1961 has
411 ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, S 22. 412 Judicial Article of 1961, S 21.
413 People v. Benefiel, 405 111.500,91 N.E.2d 427 (1950); People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596,
150 N.E. 280 (1925).
414 ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 33. The italics are in the text of the Constitution. Similar pro-
visions were contained in Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1818 and in Sec-
tion 26 of Article V of the Constitution of 1848.
415 People v. Wleklinski, 25 111. App. 2d 233, 166 N.E.2d 469 (1960); People v. Neal,
9 11. App.2d 562, 133 N.E.2d 771 (1956); People v. Whitmer, 243 I11. App. 244 (1927);
People v. Martin, 180 111. App. 578 (1913); Wallahan v. Ingersoll, 117 I11. 123, 7 N.E. 519
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completely omitted the above provision, thus making the use of formal
language in process and in pleadings in criminal cases unnecessary.
52. Inconsistent Statutes and Rules Invalid
The Judicial Article of 1961 provides: 416
After the adoption of this Article the General Assembly shall enact such
laws and make such appropriations and the Supreme Court shall make such
rules as may be necessary or proper to give effect to its provisions.
It is expected that prior to January 1, 1964, the Illinois statutes and
rules of the Supreme Court will be harmonized with the Judicial
Article of 1961.
The Judicial Article of 1961 further provides: 41 7
Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Article, all pro-
visions of law and rules of court in force on the Effective Date of this Article
shall continue in effect until superseded in a manner authorized by the Consti-
tution.
Therefore, the "provisions of law and rules of court in force on"
January 1, 1964, will be invalid to the extent that they are "incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Article. ' 41 This is a safety valve to
take care of any oversight in the process of harmonization prior to
January 1, 1964.
53. Alleviating the Backlog in the Trial Courts of Cook County
In recent years the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County
and the Municipial Court of Chicago have had large backlogs. Will
the Judicial Article of 1961 alleviate this problem? To attempt to
answer this question, the following factors must be taken into con-
sideration.
1. At present, the Appellate Court for the First District, which
handles appeals from decisions of the various trial courts of Cook
County, is presided over by nine judges of the Circuit and Superior
(1886); Sidwell v. Schumacher, 99 I1. 426 (1881); People v. Gould, 89 11. 216 (1878);
Parris v. People, 76 Ill. 274 (1875); Hay v. People, 59 111. 94 (1871); Illinois C. R.R. v.
Herr, 54 Ill. 356 (1870); Boyd v. Cudderback, 31 Ill. 113 (1863); McFadden v. Fortier,
20 Ill. 509 (1858); Wight v. People, 15 I. 417 (1854); People v. Mississippi & Ad. R.R.,
13 M11. 67 (1851); Donnelly v. People ex. rel. Bush, 11 M1. 552 (1850); Ferris v. Crow,
10 Ill. 96 (1848); Reddick v. Cloud's Adm'rs, 7 111. 670 (1845); Whitesides v. People,
1 Ill. 21 (1819).
416 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 1.
417 Id. para. 2. 418 Ibid.
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Courts of Cook County. Under the Judicial Article of 1961, the
Appellate Court for the First District will have twelve judges, all of
whom will be elected as judges of the Appellate Court."' This will
give the integrated Circuit Court of Cook County an automatic in-
crease of nine judges.
2. At present, appeals from decisions of the Probate Court of Cook
County, in cases involving less than $3,000, are taken to the Circuit or
Superior Court of Cook County for trial de novo.420 Under the Judi-
cial Article of 1961, no such trials de novo will exist and to this extent
additional judicial manpower will be available.
3. At present, appeals from decisions of justices of the peace and
from police magistrates are taken to courts of record for trial de
novo.421 Under the Judicial Article of 1961, no such trials de novo
will exist and to this extent additional judicial manpower will be
available.
4. The county judge now has numerous non-judicial duties, such
as the supervision of the election machinery of the county422 and the
organization of municipal corporations. 42 3 The Judicial Article of
1961 provides that "until otherwise provided by law non-judicial
functions vested by law in county courts or the judges thereof are
transferred to the circuit courts. ' '424 These non-judicial functions
should be promptly removed from the judicial system, and to this ex-
tent, judicial manpower will be increased.
5. There are in Cook County 56 Masters in Chancery who work on
a part-time basis and render valuable services in the taking of evidence
and in the submission of findings of fact. These officers, who are paid
for their services by the litigants, are abolished by the Judicial Article
of 1961.42' The work which these Masters in Chancery now perform
will fall upon the judges of the integrated Circuit Court of Cook
County. To this extent the work of the court will be increased.
6. At present, decisions of administrative agencies are reviewable
by the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County. Under the Judi-
cial Article of 1961, the Legislature may provide for review of ad-
ministative decisions either by the circuit courts or Appellate Court. 26
419 Judicial Article of 1961, §§ 6,10,11. 420 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 330 (1961).
421 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 79, §§ 116,173 (1961).
422 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1961).
423 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24; ch. 42; ch. 127 (1961).
424 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 5 (a).
425 Id. S 8. 42 Id. S§ 7,9.
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It is to be expected that the Illinois Legislature will provide for review
by the Appellate Court of decisions of a number of administrative
agencies, as the Congress of the United States has done with regard to
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and many
others. 427 If the Illinois Legislature does so, additional judicial man-
power will be available in the integrated Circuit Court of Cook
County.
7. Under the Judicial Article of 1961, magistrates will have author-
ity to hear cases which are now within the jurisdiction of justices of
the peace and police magistrates, until otherwise prescribed by the
General Assembly. 428 The Legislature may wish to give magistrates
authority to hear the following matters:
(1) Uncontested matters in the probate of wills and the administration of
decedent's estates.
(2) Uncontested matters in the administration of minor's estates.
(3) Uncontested matters in the administration of incompetent's estates.
(4) Adoption of children.
(5) Change of name.
(6) Uncontested Torrens' cases.
(7) Default or uncontested divorce and separate maintenance cases. 429
(8) Assessment of damages in defaulted cases. 430
(9) Prove-ups in uncontested condemnation cases.431 Two judges in the
Circuit Court of Cook County and two judges in the Superior Court of
Cook County devote full time to condemnation cases, more than 95%
of which cases are uncontested at the time of trial because the attorneys
for the plaintiff and defendant have agreed on a price.
(10) Prove-ups of tort cases against the City of Chicago.432
(11) Pre-trial conferences, which now take the full time of three judges in the
Superior Court of Cook County and of three judges in the Circuit Court
of Cook County.
(12) Assignment call.
427 See FINS, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 176-7 (1960).
428 Judicial Article of 1961, Schedule, para. 9.
429 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 9,10 (1961).
430 See Section 71 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 71 (1961).
431 See ILL. CONST. art. II, S 13. In condemnation cases the parties may waive a jury
and consent to have the case tried by the court. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. v. Hock, 118 I11.
587, 9 N.E. 205 (1886). In a condemnation case, the trial court has authority to enter a
remittitur and to proceed therein as in any other civil case. Department of Pub. Works
& Bldg. v. Huff, 15 lll.2d 517, 155 N.E.2d 563 (1959).
432 About 25 years ago a scandal took place involving the settlement of tort cases
against the City of Chicago. As a result thereof, it has been established as a practice that
all tort cases against the City of Chicago which are settled must be proved up and judg-
ment entered thereon.
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(13) Arraignment in criminal cases.
(14) Bail forfeiture in criminal cases.
The handling of these matters by magistrates would result in a sub-
stantial increase in judicial manpower in the integrated Circuit Court
of Cook County.
On the whole, the Judicial Article of 1961, with cooperative im-
plementation by the Legislature, could alleviate considerably the
backlog in the trial courts of Cook County.
During the special session of the Illinois Legislature, which was held
in October and November, 1961, seventeen new Superior Court
judgeships were created, which judges will be chosen at the general
election to be held on November 6, 1962.28 These new judges will
definitely help to reduce the backlog. It is hoped that this increase in
Cook County judgeships may be an indication of the Illinois Legisla-
ture's conscious realization of the shortage in judicial personnel which
Cook County is facing as a result of a general increase in population
and the growth and expansion of commerce and industry.
CONCLUSION
Much work lies ahead in the implementation of the Judicial Article
of 1961:
On behalf of the General Assembly every section of the Illinois
Statute book will have to be carefully examined to determine its
applicability in the light of the new constitutional provisions. In the
Civil Practice Act, literally every word will have to be reconsidered,
a number of sections will have to be repealed and the phraseology in
many other sections changed. The same is true of the Administrative
Review Act. The many statutes now dealing with review of adminis-
trative agency decisions will have to be given careful consideration
and revision. In the Probate Act there are many phrases, such as "pro-
bate court," "court of record," "trial de novo" and others, which will
have to be deleted. The same is true of many other statutes. In the Elec-
tion Code, the Municipal Code, and the School Code, references to the
"county court" and "county judge" will have to be deleted and substi-
tutions made. In the Criminal Code, references to "justices of the
peace," "police magistrates" and "writs of error" will have to be deleted
and revised. The Court Administrator Act will require re-examination
and revision and so will the Costs Act.
433 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 2-10 (1961 Supp.).
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On behalf of the Supreme Court, it will be necessary to re-examine
literally every word in the present Rules of the Court, to abrogate some,
to amend some, and to draft some new rules, particularly with regard to
interlocutory appeals and appeal periods in all cases.
The Uniform Appellate Court Rules, which are now geared to the
present Supreme Court Rules, will require attention and amendment.
The task ahead is stupendous. It requires the assistance of the most
able lawyers available, and it is the sacred duty of each member of the
Bench and Bar to render services to the best of his ability so that this
gigantic undertaking may be accomplished with the utmost of accu-
racy and in due time.
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